On Thu, Dec 03, 2015 at 03:49:02AM +0000, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: > > It is far from clear that the privacy gains anything in the form of > > practical protection. Having looked at it, I'm unconvinced. And I've been > > a privacy/crypto advocate for a very very long time. > > I resolve DNS through Tor and so in that case, my TLS connections > often exit over a different circuit. My TLS connection would not > otherwise leak the host I'm requesting if the protocol had a way to > protect that data. It doesn't. The protocol leak is the problem.
The most compelling argument for SNI encryption I took away from this thread the cheap opportunity for blocking traffic based on cleartext SNI. Of course SNI encryption can't help if the destination IP address supports one or a very few related domains, but it could help otherwise. Of course nation-states willing to play hardball will work-around the problem, but they are doing that even without encrypted SNI. [ Those of you on the crypto list will have seen the announcement about Kazakhstan mandating a national security certificate which must be installed on all customer devices that use the Internet... ] -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls