On Jan 25, 2016, at 2:43 PM, Hubert Kario wrote: > On Monday 25 January 2016 10:29:18 Benjamin Kaduk wrote: >> On 01/22/2016 01:14 PM, Hubert Kario wrote: >>> On Friday 22 January 2016 10:39:26 Andrey Jivsov wrote: >>>> On 01/22/2016 03:14 AM, Hubert Kario wrote: >>>>>> The only solution that's available at this point is conditioning >>>>>> TLS >>>>>> 1.3 support on appropriate hardware. For this reason TLS 1.3 it >>>>>> probably won't be enabled by default in the product I work on. I >>>>>> would prefer for TLS 1.3 to be enabled by default and write the >>>>>> code >>>>>> to decide whether it does PSS or falls back to RSA PKCS1 1.5. >>>>> >>>>> Yes, it would be nice. But PKCS#1 v1.5 had it long coming. Not >>>>> cutting it off now would be negligent. >>>> >>>> You mean for HS only, while leaving it for X.509 certs? >>> >>> If we don't do it for HS in TLS first, we'll never get rid of it in >>> X.509 certs. >>> >>> We need to start somewhere, and it's more reasonable to expect that >>> hardware with support for new protocols will get updated for RSA-PSS >>> handling than that libraries and hardware will suddenly start >>> implementing it in droves just in anticipation of the time when CAs >>> _maybe_ will start issuing certificates signed with RSA-PSS. >> >> Isn't it more a matter of TLS being a consumer of external PKIX >> infrastructure, the web PKI, etc.? They are out of the reach of the >> IETF TLS working group; any requirements we attempted to impose would >> be unenforceable, even if there was an Internet Police (which there >> is not). > > TLS will happily use PKCS#1 v1.5 signed X.509 certificates, so how > exactly is creating a side effect of increasing the deployment rate of > RSA-PSS _in TLS implementations_ an "overreach"?!
I have been a supporter of PSS for a very long time -- see RFC 4055. We have many algorithm transition issues, but this is one place where we have seen very little progress. I would like to see support for PSS in the protocol, even if we need to support PKCS v1.5 for certificate signatures for a long time. Russ _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
