To avoid a lot of "Over my dead body" comments, these
requirements should be met with a very visible man in the middle
and two (or more) TLS sessions. This architecture should provide
some security from unwanted men in the middle, as well as making
it obvious to the endpoints who that man in the middle is.
Cheers - Bill
On 4/5/16 at 10:29 AM, s...@sn3rd.com (Sean Turner) wrote:
With my chair hat on, I won’t comment one way or the other on
whether this should be done, but we have gone down this path
before. As I recall, the proposal was pretty resoundingly rejected.
But, what I will say as chair is that this would most definitely require a
charter change for the WG.
spt
On Apr 04, 2016, at 14:24, Phil Lello <p...@dunlop-lello.uk> wrote:
Hi,
I have a use-case for allowing an MITM to monitor traffic, but not impersonate
a server, and to allow MITM signing for replay of
server-responses to support caching.
As far as I'm aware, TLS currently only supports a shared-secret once session
initialisation is complete, so I'd need to extend the
protocol to support asymmetric encryption for the session.
Would there be interest in extending TLS to:
- allow monitoring-with-consent (based on asymmetric encryption)?
- allow re-signing from an authorised MITM to support caching?
Best wishes,
Phil Lello
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Bill Frantz |"Web security is like medicine - trying to
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408-356-8506 |an evolved body of kludges" - Mark Miller
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