My argument was aimed at focusing on the real topic at hand, not at
mixing this with "religious" beliefs as ditching ciphers without clear
justification (no matter how ancient 3-DES may be [I was in elementary
school then]).
I think it is unwise thinking too lightly about writing IETF drafts with
"die-die-die" in the title, just because one feels like it, in an almost
context-free manner. Or, is the idea to launch an entire series of
die-die-die drafts, because one finds some excuse to do so? I cannot
deny I also like shiny new things and we may all suffer from
not-invented-here syndromes, but acknowledging this playing in the
background of our perceptions should also give us some reason to pause
and have some restraint here.
Rene
On 8/29/2016 5:48 PM, Jon Callas wrote:
On Aug 29, 2016, at 6:26 AM, Rene Struik <rstruik....@gmail.com> wrote:
I think it is a mistake to think that simply using block ciphers with a larger
block size is enough to counter attacks, as the literature on successful side
channel attacks on such block cipher demonstrates. The real message is that one
should not reuse keys ad infinitum, which unfortunately seems hard to sink in.
Singling out 3-DES in this respect does not seem to tackle the real issue
(which is a system security issue often only paid lip service to in practice).
Yes, we should just stop using 64-bit block ciphers and deal with the issues
you mention within the context of larger blocks.
Jon
--
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