On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 2:03 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusva...@welho.com> wrote:
> > There's my confusion. I misinterpreted both the Zero-RTT diagram and the > > table of handshake contexts under "Authentication Messages", specifically > > "ClientHello ... later of EncryptedExtensions/CertificateRequest". I'm > > guessing I should be looking at the 0-RTT row only? I.e., if 0-RTT is > > accepted, is the second Finished message from the client ("{Finished}") > the > > same message encrypted differently (using the handshake traffic secret)? > > No, there is no difference in ClientFinished in case of 0-RTT accept or > reject (other than the contents of the CH and EE hashed in). > Still confused. :-) In the message flow for 0-RTT, there are two Finished messages sent from client to server. One is sent right after CH, and is protected by the client_early_traffic_secret: (Finished). The other is sent after the server sends its Finished, and this is protected by the handshake_traffic_secret: {Finished}. In the table under "Authentication Messages", there are four rows, one for each Mode: 0-RTT, 1-RTT (Server), 1-RTT (Client), and Post-Handshake. Which handshake context is used for the (Finished) message and which is used for the {Finished} message? The thing that protects the 0-RTT data from substitution is the record > protection MACs that are made using key derived from the PSK secret. So > if the PSK secret is unknown, the key for 0-RTT can't be derived, and > as consequence, 0-RTT data can't be altered (there's end-of-data marker > too, preventing truncation). > Altered is one thing, and I agree that is prevented; I'm talking about substitution. > And basically, ServerFinished MAC covers everything up to that point, > and ClientFinished MAC covers the entiere handshake (0-RTT data not > included). > So client Finished doesn't protect 0-RTT data, but... > You can't swap out 0-RTT data (without PSK keys). One can only create > new connection attempts (that fail!) with the same 0-RTT data (and the > same ClientHello) before or after the real connection (if any, it > could be supressed, in which case you would get only failed handshakes > with 0-RTT data). > This is exactly what I'm trying to understand. What specifically prevents this swapping? I.e., what ties the 0-RTT data sent on a particular connection to the rest of that connection, such that replacing that 0-RTT data with 0-RTT data from a previous successful connection will cause a failure? Kyle
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