First: where can we see the study that proves people are indeed confused that 
TLS > SSL? I don’t buy into that. Are people really confused after 17 years of 
TLS?

Second: I don’t think that the changes between TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 are 
considered a major: just look at the difference between HTTP/2 and HTTP/1 - 
those are completely different protocols.

Most of TLS 1.3 could be implemented on top of TLS 1.2 with extensions (the way 
it really looks, if you consider even client_version remains the same).

Third: There was *some* marketing on TLS 1.3, and changing the name now will 
just tell the public the WG is confused and doesn’t know what its doing.

I vote for TLS 1.3.


> On 18 Nov 2016, at 10:07, D. J. Bernstein <d...@cr.yp.to> wrote:
> 
> The largest number of users have the least amount of information, and
> they see version numbers as part of various user interfaces. It's clear
> how they will be inclined to guess 3>1.3>1.2>1.1>1.0 (very bad) but
> 4>3>1.2>1.1>1.0 (eliminating the problem as soon as 4 is supported).
> 
> We've all heard anecdotes of 3>1.2>1.1>1.0 disasters. Even if this type
> of disaster happens to only 1% of site administrators, it strikes me as
> more important for security than any of the arguments that have been
> given for "TLS 1.3". So I would prefer "TLS 4".
> 
> Yes, sure, we can try to educate people that TLS>SSL (but then we're
> fighting against tons of TLS=SSL messaging), or educate them to use
> server-testing tools (so that they can fix the problem afterwards---but
> I wonder whether anyone has analyzed the damage caused by running SSLv3
> for a little while before switching the same keys to a newer protocol),
> and hope that this education fights against 3>1.3 more effectively than
> it fought against 3>1.2. But it's better to switch to a less error-prone
> interface that doesn't require additional education in the first place.
> 
> ---Dan
> 
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