> On Nov 30, 2016, at 10:51 PM, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote: > > > > On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 9:50 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-d...@dukhovni.org> > wrote: > > The current text reads: > > Section 4.4.1.2 ( > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#page-56 ) > > All certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a signature > algorithm that appears in the "signature_algorithms" extension > provided by the client, if they are able to provide such a chain (see > Section 4.2.3). Certificates that are self-signed or certificates > that are expected to be trust anchors are not validated as part of > the chain and therefore MAY be signed with any algorithm. > > [...] > > It's "MUST if... ". That's different from SHOULD unless because it > means that the unless clause is that only reason for violating it, and then > if that condition obtains it SHOULD do X but could presumably do > other things.
Yes, I see. The stretch of text between the "MUST" and the "if" just happened to overflow my stack limit when I was rereading this today... Please pardon the short attention span. So all is well, unless there is merit it trying to word-smith the text to bring the "MUST" and "if" closer together.... The good new is that the intent is already just right. > I don't see any difference between "MUST whenever possible" > and the current language. Yes, fair enough... > On a related note, is there in the current draft anything that > requires ECDSA certificates to bear ECDSA issuer signatures? > > No. Nor has that been true since TLS 1.2. See: > https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5246#section-7.4.2 Great. Thanks. -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
