On Fri, Dec 02, 2016 at 03:35:00AM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
> I think TLS 4 makes everything worse, not better.
> 
> In hindsight, renaming SSL 3.1 was a terrible mistake. But TLS 1.2 is going
> to exist for a long time. If we call the next one 4, we have to explain a
> gap in the versioning (1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 4?) and placing 2.0 and 3.0 after 1.2
> becomes even more inviting.
> 
> Short of a time machine so we can call this SSL 3.4, the best fix is to let
> SSL 3.0 fall away. This is already semi-plausible (it's out of all
> browsers) and is only going to become more realistic over time. Certainly
> it will be faster than TLS 1.2 going away and undoing TLS 4's version gap
> problem. (TLS 1.3 even places SSL 3.0 as a MUST NOT, for what little teeth
> that has.)
> 
> Once SSL 3.0 falls away, we'll be left with 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, which
> is a plausible numbering progression. There'll still be the mess with SSL
> being the informal name for the protocol family, but that isn't a numbering
> problem.

Then "TLS 2017" should be even better.  It's neither < 3 nor similar
enough to SSL versions as to be confused with them.

And the shift in versioning strategy is so typical it would probably not
even draw serious notice.

-- 
Scott Schmit

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