> On 01 Mar 2017, at 13:18, Dang, Quynh (Fed) <quynh.d...@nist.gov> wrote: > > > > From: Aaron Zauner <a...@azet.org> > Date: Wednesday, March 1, 2017 at 8:11 AM > To: 'Quynh' <quynh.d...@nist.gov> > Cc: Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, IRTF CFRG > <c...@irtf.org> > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769). > >> >>> On 25 Feb 2017, at 14:28, Dang, Quynh (Fed) <quynh.d...@nist.gov> wrote: >>> Hi Sean, Joe, Eric and all, >>> I would like to address my thoughts/suggestions on 2 issues in option a. >>> 1) The data limit should be addressed in term of blocks, not records. When >>> the record size is not the full size, some user might not know what to do. >>> When the record size is 1 block, the limit of 2^24.5 blocks (records) is >>> way too low unnecessarily for the margin of 2^-60. In that case, 2^34.5 >>> 1-block records is the limit which still achieves the margin of 2^-60. >> >> I respectfully disagree. TLS deals in records not in blocks, so in the end >> any semantic change here will just confuse implementors, which isn't a good >> idea in my opinion. > > Over the discussion of the PRs, the preference was blocks.
I don't see a clear preference. I see Brian Smith suggested switching to blocks to be more precise in a PR. But in general it seems to me that "Option A" was preferred in this thread anyhow - so these PRs aren't relevant? I'm not sure that text on key-usage limits in blocks in a spec that fundamentally deals in records is less confusing, quite the opposite (at least to me). As I pointed out earlier: I strongly recommend that any changes to the spec are as clear als possible to engineers (non-crypto/math people) -- e.g. why the spec is suddenly dealing in blocks instead of records et cetera. Again; I really don't see any reason to change text here - to me all suggested changes are even more confusing. Aaron
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