The chairs are forwarding this document to our AD to progress towards publication.
Cheers, Joe On Tue, Apr 11, 2017 at 8:21 AM, Joseph Salowey <j...@salowey.net> wrote: > Hi Daniel, > > Please submit a revised draft with the changes below. > > Thanks, > > Joe > > > On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 11:08 AM, Daniel Migault < > daniel.miga...@ericsson.com> wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> Thank you for the review and comments received. Given the discussion our >> understanding was that the consensus was to remove CCM-256 so that suites >> defined by the document apply both for TLS1.2 as well as for TLS1.3. The >> draft available on github [1 >> <https://github.com/mglt/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/blob/master/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead>] >> has been updated as follows: >> >> >> 1. Why does TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8_SHA256 use SHA256 instead >> of SHA384 like the other 256 bit cipher suites? (From Russ Housley) >> >> MGLT: This was a mistake in the IANA section. The cypher suite was >> correct in the remaining text. However, the current version does not >> consider anymore CCM-256* which also solves this issue. >> >> 2. Since the security considerations mention passwords (human chosen >> secrets) it should mention dictionary attacks. (From Russ Housley) >> >> MGLT: The issue of human chosen passwords and dictionary attacks has been >> mentioned in the security consideration with the following text: >> >> """ >> Use of Pre-Shared Keys of limited entropy may allow an active >> attacker attempts to connect to the server and tries different keys. >> For example, limited entropy may be provided by using short PSK in >> which case an attacker may perform a brute-force attack. Other >> example includes the use of a PSK chosen by a human and thus may be >> exposed to dictionary attacks. >> """ >> >> >> 3. Section 2 and 3 of the document contains more detail about TLS 1.3 >> than necessary. >> >> Section 2: This document only defines cipher suites for TLS 1.2, not TLS >> 1.2 or later. A subset of equivalent cipher suites is defined in the TLS >> 1.3 specification. >> >> MGLT: CCM-256 has been removed from the specification so that suites can >> be defined for TLS 1.2 as well as TLS1.3. The following text is considered. >> >> """ >> This document defines new cipher suites that provide Pre-Shared Key >> (PSK) authentication, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), and >> Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). The cipher >> suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security >> (TLS) [RFC5246] protocol, version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer >> Security (DTLS) protocol [RFC6347], as well as version 1.3 of TLS >> [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. >> """ >> >> Section 3 and 4: Maybe replace the last 2 paragraphs with an addition to >> section 4 that states: >> >> "TLS 1.3 and above name, negotiate and support a subset of these cipher >> suites in a different way." (TLS 1.3 does not support >> TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384 and TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM >> _8_SHA256) >> >> MGLT: As CCM-256 has been removed, we do not have to deal with the >> situation where TLS1.3 only considers a subset of the suites defined for >> TLS1.2. >> >> The following sentence in section 3 clarifies that codes points are only >> defined for TLS1.2: “””The assigned code points can only be used for TLS >> 1.2.”””. The description of the TLS1.3 negotiation has been limited in >> section 4 to the following sentence: “””TLS 1.3 and above version, >> negotiate and support these cipher suites in a different way.””” >> >> 4. Section 3 should contain a bit more detail about relationship to 4492 >> bis and RFC 4279: >> >> Something like the following may be enough. >> >> "This messages and pre-master secret construction in this document are >> based on [RFC4279]. The elliptic curve parameters used in in the >> Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in >> [4492-bis]." >> >> MGLT: The sentence mentioned above has been added with [4492-bis] >> mentioned as normative. >> “”” >> Messages and pre-master secret construction in this document are >> based on [RFC4279]. The elliptic curve parameters used in in the >> Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in >> [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis]. >> “”” >> >> [1] https://github.com/mglt/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/blob/m >> aster/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead >> >> Yours, >> Daniel and John >> >> >> On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 1:22 PM, Joseph Salowey <j...@salowey.net> wrote: >> >>> Here are the open issues for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead >>> >>> 1. Why does TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8_SHA256 use SHA256 instead >>> of SHA384 like the other 256 bit cipher suites? (From Russ Housley) >>> >>> 2. Since the security considerations mention passwords (human chosen >>> secrets) it should mention dictionary attacks. (From Russ Housley) >>> >>> 3. Section 2 and 3 of the document contains more detail about TLS 1.3 >>> than necessary. >>> >>> Section 2: This document only defines cipher suites for TLS 1.2, not TLS >>> 1.2 or later. A subset of equivalent cipher suites is defined in the TLS >>> 1.3 specification. >>> >>> Section 3 and 4: Maybe replace the last 2 paragraphs with an addition to >>> section 4 that states: >>> >>> "TLS 1.3 and above name, negotiate and support a subset of these cipher >>> suites in a different way." (TLS 1.3 does not support >>> TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384 and TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256 >>> _CCM_8_SHA256) >>> >>> 4. Section 3 should contain a bit more detail about relationship to 4492 >>> bis and RFC 4279: >>> >>> Something like the following may be enough. >>> >>> "This messages and pre-master secret construction in this document are >>> based on [RFC4279]. The elliptic curve parameters used in in the >>> Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in >>> [4492-bis]." >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Joe >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list >>> TLS@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >>> >>> >> >
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