On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 9:26 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL < u...@ll.mit.edu> wrote: > > Same question. At some point in time you need to decide to start examining > all the traffic. At that point you can start capturing its plaintext. The > proposed alternative seems to be capturing the ciphertext and the key so > the ciphertext can be decrypted later – which makes no sense to me. >
That's not what I've seen. Instead, I see administrators creating port mirrors on demand and then filtering the traffic they are interested in using standard tcpdump rules, and I see MITM boxes that selectively decrypt some traffic to look inside it and apply some kind of security filtering. In the former case, DNS lookups and IP/port destinations are commonly used to trigger some suspicions too. > They are, though it's a big change. I think we can do better than logs; a > mechanism that's in TLS itself could be opt-in and user-aware, and so less > likely to be abused in other situations. There's also some basic security > model advantages to encrypting the PMS under a public-private key pair, and > one that isn't using the private key that the servers themselves hold. > > > > To use the key you need to have the corresponding ciphertext stored. > That's not how the tcpdump/wireshark approach usually works. You give it the private key and decrypts the TLS connection as it's happening. -- Colm
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