> complicated-to-implement and largely ineffective solution such as
subverting draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility for improper purposes?
The phrase “subverting for improper purposes” is inaccurate, and perhaps
misleading. We would be providing another cleartext signal and we have to
expect that someone will use it; anything else would be naïve. All the
discussions about “ossification” in the past two years should make that
painfully obvious.
As for “improper purposes,” it’s something enabled by the protocol, even if
it’s not what the proposers intended it for. But isn’t the whole story of the
Internet? If the purposes are really improper, define things in a way that it
can only be used properly, for whatever that definition is.
So far, we’ve seen that it can be used to segregate clients, open them up to
stream modification, and the only justification has been that this is perceived
easier to keep visibility as currently built by sharing static RSA keys.
Do I have that right?
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