The obvious problem with randomly adding fake versions is you have to have a way of ensuring they won't conflict with *real* future versions - and whatever pattern you decide upon in order to do that, middleboxes will use that pattern to filter out fake versions, and fail as soon as you present one with a real future version (i.e. TLS 1.4).
Can I also suggest adding a section about expected middlebox behaviour to TLS 1.3? That way there is a reasonable chance that TLS 1.4 won't face the same issues. (Or can I do that myself? I'm not really familiar with the process, sorry) On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 8:21 AM, Yuhong Bao <yuhongbao_...@hotmail.com> wrote: > That only applies to the ClientHello. > > ________________________________________ > From: Andrei Popov <andrei.po...@microsoft.com> > Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 11:22:23 AM > To: Yuhong Bao; Peter Saint-Andre; Eric Rescorla > Cc: tls@ietf.org; Tapio Sokura > Subject: RE: [TLS] PR#1091: Changes to provide middlebox robustness > > The idea was for the client to randomly add non-existent TLS versions to > supported_versions. > Presumably, this will exercise the extensibility joint and prevent it from > becoming unusable. > > I'm not convinced this new approach will help, but we know the old one > required fallbacks every time a new protocol version was introduced. > > Cheers, > > Andrei > > -----Original Message----- > From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Yuhong Bao > Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 11:04 AM > To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpe...@stpeter.im>; Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> > Cc: tls@ietf.org; Tapio Sokura <tapio.sok...@iki.fi> > Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#1091: Changes to provide middlebox robustness > > They are basically doing a supported_versions extension with only one > entry in the ServerHello. > The problem with future middleboxes should be obvious. > > ________________________________________ > From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpe...@stpeter.im> > Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 11:02:39 AM > To: Yuhong Bao; Eric Rescorla > Cc: tls@ietf.org; Tapio Sokura > Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#1091: Changes to provide middlebox robustness > > On 11/22/17 11:16 AM, Yuhong Bao wrote: > > The problem is not TLS 1.3, the problem is future versions of TLS. > > Would you mind explaining that in more detail? > > Peter > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url= > https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ftls& > data=02%7C01%7CAndrei.Popov%40microsoft.com%7C71d594d28d4241b8757f08d531db > dbb2%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0% > 7C636469742719473989&sdata=fCAZVB8XHK3IJQAoSf% > 2FUwSDlHYiy2tm0WBktCGS%2BPW8%3D&reserved=0 > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
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