John,

Thanks for your comments. It's good to know that someone has already done
this!



On Fri, Jul 20, 2018 at 12:52 PM, John Mattsson <john.matts...@ericsson.com>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I looked through the draft, mainly focusing on the crypto parts. This is
> more or less ECIES, but with a more modern style of key derivation that
> most existing standards. This solution is very similar to the standardized
> 3GPP identity encryption (SUCI) with the difference that the static public
> keys are distributed through DNS instead of UICCs (aka SIM cards).
>
> The current construction looks very good.
>
> - One thing that could be discussed is integrity protection of the
> client’s ephemeral public key. The current construction
>
> encrypted_sni = AEAD-Encrypt(key, iv, "", PaddedServerNameList)
>
> does not achieve IND-CCA security (but only suffers from benign
> malleability [1][2]). An addition of the client’s key share would make the
> SNI encryption IND-CCA secure:
>
> encrypted_sni = AEAD-Encrypt(key, iv, KeyShareClientHello,
> PaddedServerNameList)
>
> Unless it causes problems of some kind, I would recommend doing that.
>

Thanks. This seems like a good plan. Would an acceptable alternative be to
hash the KeyShare into the key?



> - The hash algorithm used in “Hash(ClientHello.Random)” does not seem to
> be stated. I assume that it is the hash function associated with "suite".


Yes.



> Also, is hashing the random value needed?
>

No, it's just a result of the slightly goofy HKDF-Expand-Label interface.

-Ekr

- A mistake ECIES implementations has done in the past is to let the
> integrity key depend on the plaintext which breaks the security proof of
> ECIES, but this is not the case here.
>



> Cheers,
> John
>
> [1] http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf
> [2] http://shoup.net/papers/iso-2_1.pdf
>
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