Hello,

We have prepared the following draft, and request feedback on it.  The
main points are

 * Introduction of (anonymous) Kerberos tickets as added entropy to mix
with ECDH, and thereby provide Quantum Relief; it generalises this idea
to allow for other ways of adding entropy
 * Introduction of Kerberos Tickets for Certificate and
CertificateVerify messages
 * User identity on the server side; how TLS can be relayed to a peer,
which Kerberos can handle with its user-to-user authentication
mechanism; it generalises this idea, and perhaps it might be better as a
separate TLS Extension under ClientHello encryption.
 * Everything applies to TLS 1.3 as well as 1.2.

Our intention is to launch this as an independent proposal.

Your insights are highly appreciated!


Best,

Rick van Rein
Tom Vrancken



A new version of I-D, draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-06.txt
has been successfully submitted by Rick van Rein and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-vanrein-tls-kdh
Revision:       06
Title:          Quantum Relief with TLS and Kerberos
Document date:  2020-01-22
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          19
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-06.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vanrein-tls-kdh/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-06
Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vanrein-tls-kdh
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-06

Abstract:
   This specification describes a mechanism to use Kerberos
   authentication within the TLS protocol.  This gives users of TLS a
   strong alternative to classic PKI-based authentication, and at the
   same introduces a way to insert entropy into TLS' key schedule such
   that the resulting protocol becomes resistant against attacks from
   quantum computers.  We call this Quantum Relief, and specify it as
   part of a more general framework to make it easier for other
   technologies to achieve similar benefits.

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