Thanks Ekr. I have created PR https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/138 implementing the suggestion. ________________________________ From: Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 4:30 PM To: Hanno Becker <hanno.bec...@arm.com> Cc: tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] [DTLS] ACK's for post-handshake authentication requests
Thanks. This seems like a good improvement. I have filed https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/128 to track it. On Fri, Mar 27, 2020 at 8:29 AM Hanno Becker <hanno.bec...@arm.com<mailto:hanno.bec...@arm.com>> wrote: I have a minor comment on DTLS 1.3 draft 37. On the topic of sending ACKs, the draft recommends: ``` ACKs SHOULD NOT be sent for other complete flights because they are implicitly acknowledged by the receipt of the next flight, which generally immediately follows the flight. ``` I wonder if the case of post-handshake authentication should be explicitly mentioned as a potential exception to this rule, since the TLS 1.3 RFC explicitly mentions that responses to `CertificateRequest` may be delayed in some contexts: ``` Note: Because client authentication could involve prompting the user, servers MUST be prepared for some delay, including receiving an arbitrary number of other messages between sending the CertificateRequest and receiving a response. ``` In this case, it would be beneficial to immediately explicitly ACK the `CertificateRequest` message even though it is also implicitly acked through the eventual response via the `Certificate` message. Regards, Hanno IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
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