> On Oct 27, 2020, at 10:32, Daniel Migault <mglt.i...@gmail.com> wrote: > > To address the comment below, keeping weak security is likely to weaken > current and future IoT communications, so I do not think there is room for > compromise with performance. Of course this is in a context of TLS. I expect > protocol to leverage from TLS security, so the impact should be rather > negligible. > > """ > As those hash algorithms were 'cheap' for TLS 1.2, I would appreciate a > review of impacted IoT protocols if those algorithms are deprecated. > """
In terms of process, are you suggesting "a review of impacted IoT protocols if those algorithms are deprecated” MUST be completed prior to advancing this document to the IESG? spt > Yours, > Daniel > > > On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 10:21 AM Daniel Migault via Datatracker > <nore...@ietf.org> wrote: > Reviewer: Daniel Migault > Review result: Ready with Nits > > Hi, > > > I reviewed this document as part of the IoT Directorate's ongoing effort to > review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were > written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors. Document > authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just like > any other IETF Last Call comments. > > Review Results: Ready with Nits > > Please find my comments below. > > Yours, > Daniel > > > Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2 > draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04 > [...] > > 1. Introduction > > The usage of MD5 and SHA-1 for signature hashing in TLS 1.2 is > specified in [RFC5246]. MD5 and SHA-1 have been proven to be > insecure, subject to collision attacks [Wang]. In 2011, [RFC6151] > detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for > MD5. NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011 > [NISTSP800-131A-R2] and disallowed its use for digital signatures at > the end of 2013, based on both the Wang, et. al, attack and the > potential for brute-force attack. In 2016, researchers from INRIA > identified a new class of transcript collision attacks on TLS (and > other protocols) that rely on efficient collision-finding algorithms > on the underlying hash constructions [Transcript-Collision]. > Further, in 2017, researchers from Google and CWI Amsterdam > [SHA-1-Collision] proved SHA-1 collision attacks were practical. > This document updates [RFC5246] and [RFC7525] in such a way that MD5 > and SHA-1 MUST NOT be used for digital signatures. However, this > document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection. > > <mglt> > RFC6194 may be mentioned as a reference for > not deprecating HMAC-SHA-1 as well as an > additional reference to [NISTSP800-131A-R2]. > > Reading the text the situation of HMAC with > MD5 is unclear. Since we specify that SHA-1 > is not deprecated for HMAC we may specify > the status for HMAC with MD5. Given RFC6151 I > hope the reason is that MD5 and HMAC-MD5 has > already been deprecated but I have not found > this. Maybe that would worth mentioning it > is deprecated already. > > </mglt> > > [...] > > 2. Signature Algorithms > > Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms > extension. If a client does not send a signature_algorithms > extension, then the server MUST abort the handshake and send a > handshake_failure alert, except when digital signatures are not used > (for example, when using PSK ciphers). > > <mglt> > It seems to me that the server behavior might > be defined as well. In our case this could be > something around the lines the server MUST > ignore MD5 and SHA1 values in the signature > algorithm extension. > > </mglt> > > 3. Certificate Request > > Servers SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateRequest > messages. > > <mglt> > It seems to me that the same level of > authentication should be provided for both > peers and that server MUST NOT include MD5 > or SHA-1. > > A SHOULD NOT status might be welcome for a > smooth transition. At that time, collision > for MD5 and SHA1 are known for years. It is likely > that software that still need MD5 or SHA1 are > likely to never upgrade, so I doubt a smooth > path worth being taken. > </mglt> > > 4. Server Key Exchange > > Servers MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange messages. > If a client receives a MD5 or SHA-1 signature in a ServerKeyExchange > message it MUST abort the connection with the illegal_parameter > alert. > > <mglt> > As per section 2, the client has clearly > indicated it does not support signature with > MD5/SHA1, so Server Key Exchange should not > end up with signature with SHA1/MD5. > > """ > If the client has offered the "signature_algorithms" extension, the > signature algorithm and hash algorithm MUST be a pair listed in that > extension. > """ > > It also seems to me that the constraint of > including a MD5 and SHA-1 signature is > related to the Certificate. I suspect that > some clarification are needed here. > > Since the case where the extension becomes > mandatory, the quoted text above of RFC 5246 > might be updated as well, though this does > not appear that necessary. > > </mglt> > > 5. Certificate Verify > > Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify messages. > If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or SHA-1 it > MUST abort the connection with handshake_failure or > insufficient_security alert. > > > <mglt> > > 6. Certificate > > Unless I am missing something, it seems to me > that signature may also be found in the > Certificate messages for the chain as well in > the restriction of the signature algorithm. > The end certificate is associated to the peer > while other certificate are related to a CA. > > It seems that client and server behavior may > be specified. The quoted text below may be > helpful to clarify. > > """ > If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all > certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a > hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension. > """ > > </mglt> > > 6. Updates to RFC5246 > > [RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, > suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and SHA-1 by > their peer. This update changes the suggestion to assume support for > SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated. > > In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from: > > OLD: > > "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit > rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer > supports MD5 and SHA- 1." > > NEW: > > "Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit > rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer > supports SHA-256." > > > <mglt> > I am reading the Note as an explanation on > why sha was taken as the default hash > function with the following rules. > > """ > If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the > server MUST do the following: > > - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA, > DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had > sent the value {sha1,rsa}. > > - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS, > DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}. > > - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA, > ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. > """ > > The current document does not update the > default hash function from sha to sha256 to > avoid interoperability issue where one peer > takes sha while the other one takes sha-256. > As a results, these rules and the "Note" may > eventually all together be replaced by your > text of section 2. > > The following text may also be removed: > > """ > If the client supports only the default hash and signature algorithms > (listed in this section), it MAY omit the signature_algorithms > extension. > """ > > Regarding the Note, it seems to be that the > removal of support for MD5/SHA1 will result > in interoperability issues. At this point, > the issue is due to the obsolescence of the > implementation as deprecation of SHA1/Md5 has > started a long time ago. > > It is unclear to me how normative is > interpreted "can assume". Was the support of > MD5/SHA1 a SHOULD or a MUST? In both case, if > we were willing to maintain interoperability > between software that only implemented > MD5/SHA1, we should take a slower path and > introducing SHA-256 and having were MD5/SHA1 > kept for interoperability purpose before > being deprecated. I do not think we should > take that path as implementations that > currently do not support SHA-256 are unlikely > to be updated and that deprecation of > SHA1/MD5 has started a long time ago. > > I would however mention the issue of > interoperability in the section but not in > the text to update. In the text to update I > would maybe suggest that the support of > SHA-256 comes with a normative MUST > statement. > > > </mglt> > > Velvindron, et al. Expires April 12, 2021 [Page 3] > > Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate October 2020 > > > 7. Updates to RFC7525 > > [RFC7525], Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security > (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) recommends use of > SHA-256 as a minimum requirement. This update moves the minimum > recommendation to use stronger language deprecating use of both SHA-1 > and MD5. The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and > this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been > deprecated.. > > Section 4.3: > > OLD: > > When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with > at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key. In addition, the use > of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED (see [CAB-Baseline] for > more details). Clients SHOULD indicate to servers that they request > SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS > 1.2. > > NEW: > > Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a > 2048-bit modulus for the public key. > > In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; > and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see [CAB-Baseline] for more > details). Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA- > 256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS > 1.2. > > <mglt> > I understand the reason we do specify that > hash algorithms that MUST NOT been used. This > is fine in the context of this document, but > it seems to me that if we were writing the > updated specification we may have rather > mentioned a minimum level of security hash > function needs to be met - in our case > SHA-256. I leave the co-authors make the > appropriated choice. > > </mglt> > > > 8. IANA Considerations > > The document updates the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry to change the > recommended status of SHA-1 based signature schemes to N (not > recommended) as defined by [RFC8447]. The following entries are to > be updated: > > +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+ > | Value | Description | Recommended | Reference | > +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+ > | 0x0201 | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 | N | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] | > | 0x0203 | ecdsa_sha1 | N | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] | > +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+ > > Other entries of the resgistry remain the same. > > > <mglt> > It seems to me that TLS 1.2 is using the TLS > hash and TLS signature registry TLS signature > registry and TLS 1.3 is using Signature > Scheme. > > I suspect that TLS hash values for sha1 and > md5 should be deprecated. And RFCTBD should > be added for sha1 and md5. Note that the > SHOULD NOT status for CertificateRequest > may have prevented such deprecation. > > A side effect is these code points for > signature scheme that were assigned for > compatibility with legacy (TLS 1.2) > signatures must not be used anymore - if > there are no more valid with TLS 1.2. > </mglt> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > > -- > Daniel Migault > Ericsson _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls