I am not in favor of shrinking this to a single byte, as it significantly
limits future flexibility.

As far as I can tell, the argument here is to limit the entropy available
for tracking, but recall that in this case the attacker controls the DNS
and they can (for instance) provide a unique IPv6 address, so this doesn't
see, like a good tradeoff.

-Ekr


On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 5:44 AM Christopher Wood <c...@heapingbits.net>
wrote:

> On the heels of this change, here's another PR that I'd folks to weigh in
> on:
>
>    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/381
>
> Thanks,
> Chris
>
> On Mon, Feb 8, 2021, at 2:29 PM, Christopher Wood wrote:
> > We previously had a server-selected label for the ECHConfig, but that
> > has since been replaced with a client-computed identifier. There are a
> > couple of problems with this change in practice (see [1]), so the
> > following PR proposes reverting back to the old behavior:
> >
> >    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/376
> >
> > There is a separate issue [2] regarding the length of this identifier,
> > but we can address that separately.
> >
> > Please have a look at the PR and provide feedback. We'd like to merge
> > this soon.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Chris
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/375
> > [2] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/379
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>
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