Hello all

I've got a question regarding application of TLS 1.3 to protect long lasting  
connections. Specifically on the trigger to perform a revocation check for the 
utilized certificates in the handshake. 

The background is that for the securing TCP based communication in power system 
automation we defined the application of TLS in IEC 62351-3. The document 
specifies how to use TLS v1.2 in this environment. As some of the connections 
are rather long lasting connections, the document defines the usage of TLS 
session renegotiation at least every 24 hours to update the session key 
material on one hand and to enforce the certificate verification from both 
sides (TLS is always used with mutual authentication) including the revocation 
check. The 24 hours were motivated by an expected CRL update once a day. 

As TLS 1.3 is available the consequent next step is the consideration also for 
power system automation. In TLS 1.3 session renegotiation is not available 
anymore. The session key update can easily be addressed by the post-handshake 
messages. For performing a certificate based authentication during the session 
I understood one could use the post-handshake authentication approach. But this 
seems to be available only for a client side authentication. Is there any 
option in TLS to also enforce a server side authentication during an ongoing 
session?  Again, the reason for a certificate based authentication is to have a 
trigger for the revocation check of the certificates used in the initial 
handshake. If post-handshake certificate based authentication is not supported 
in TLS 1.3, it would require to have a separate mechanism/process that checks 
the revocation state of the certificates utilized in the initial handshake. 

Hence the question if there is a feature in TLS 1.3, which would provide the 
functionality to invoke a mutual certificate based authentication.

Best regards
Steffen

--
Steffen Fries
Siemens AG

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