Hiya,
I like the text below as a starter. I'd suggest it also include something to take into account the ECH issue mentioned on the dpriv list [1] S[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dns-privacy/3xL59_1P0ZHOUEYsDJ1Q22ZZVvo/
On 30/04/2021 07:46, Martin Thomson wrote:
On Fri, Apr 30, 2021, at 16:25, Valery Smyslov wrote:The original motivation for 7525bis was to update RFC 7525 in light of TLS 1.3 appearance. However, I believe that recommendations for using ALPN are in scope of this document.How about a new Section 3.7 "Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation": --- TLS implementations MUST support the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension [RFC7301]. Correct use of ALPN ensures that clients and servers agree on a negotiated protocol. Newly defined application protocols that use TLS MUST define an ALPN identifier and mandate the use of ALPN for negotiating the protocol. An existing application protocol might not have been assigned an ALPN identifier. For other protocols the ALPN identifier might not have been part of the original protocol definition, or use of ALPN might have been defined originally as being optional. In all of these cases, implementations cannot require the use of ALPN. A server implementation MUST fail a connection attempt with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert if it is configured to use a protocol that has no assigned ALPN identifier and a client offers an "application_layer_protocol_negotiation" extension. --- This last bit might be an update to RFC 7301, but it's important for protecting against cross-protocol attacks on clients that support protocols with ALPN identifiers where the use of ALPN is not guaranteed._______________________________________________ Uta mailing list u...@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta
OpenPGP_0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc
Description: application/pgp-keys
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Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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