This document seems fine to me, but the first paragraph of Section 3 needs some work. This can be sorted out after adoption.
Section 3 begins with: When a record with CID is received that has the source address of the enclosing UDP datagram different from the one previously associated with that CID, the receiver MUST NOT update its view of the peer's IP address and port number with the source specified in the UDP datagram before cryptographically validating the enclosed record(s) but instead perform a return routability check. I agree that the return routability check should be performed before updating the peer's IP address and port number, but I the part about "before cryptographically validating the enclosed record" seems to open up some opportunities for trouble. Russ > On May 3, 2021, at 11:44 AM, Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com> wrote: > > Hi! > > We would like to re-run the WG adoption call for "Return Routability Check > for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3”. Please state whether you support adoption of this > draft as a WG item by posting a message to the TLS list by 2359 UTC 24 May > 2021. Please include any additional information that is helpful in > understanding your position. > > NOTES: > > 1) We are re-running this WG adoption now that DTLS 1.3 [1] and Connection > Identifiers for DTLS 1.2 [2] is done. > 2) Here is a link to the original WG adoption call [3]. > > Thanks, > Chris, Joe, and Sean > > [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/ > [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id/ > [3] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/IJYqpTmSHsCkiMaUPt_AltvKbe8/ > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls