On 8/26/21 at 6:01 PM, m...@lowentropy.net (Martin Thomson) wrote:

That Signal was hard is interesting, but I don't think that the authors were sufficiently creative. They say "these low-bandwidth attacks cannot be used to leak the short-term, ephemeral keys", but I don't think that is true at all. I'll leave it as an exercise for the reader, but I believe it to be trivial to have all keying material available to the observer if an endpoint is cooperative.

And remember, you don't have to exfiltrate the whole key to make the exhaustive search problem much easier.

Cheers - Bill

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