Hi Yaron,

Where do you believe OCSP will be a good fit and why?

Ciao
Hannes

From: TLS <tls-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Yaron Sheffer
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2022 3:57 PM
To: u...@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] OCSP in RFC7525bis

Hi,

RFC 7525 (the TLS BCP) has a section [1] with “weak” recommendations to use 
OCSP and OCSP stapling. We are changing these recommendations [2] in view of 
OCSP stapling in TLS 1.3 and the obsolescence of RFC 6961.

But this raises a larger question: many client-side implementations soft-fail 
if they don’t get an OCSP response within the handshake, i.e. they just ignore 
the problem. As far as we understand, this makes OCSP stapling completely 
ineffective for what it’s trying to solve.

So for the new BCP, we have three options:

  *   Add a SHOULD-level requirement (for TLS 1.3 implementations, possibly 
also TLS 1.2 implementations) to fail the handshake if the OCSP response is 
missing or invalid. (As far as we can tell, RFC 8446 is silent on this.)
  *   Remove the whole discussion of OCSP, saying that in its current form it’s 
not adding value.
  *   Maintain the status quo, where many people implement OCSP on the server 
side, but clients rarely benefit.

We would be grateful for feedback based on implementation experience. In 
particular if you have quantitative data on the use or quality of OCSP that’s 
more recent than Chung18 [3], that would be very useful.

Thanks,
                Peter, Thomas and Yaron

PS: apologies for cross-posting.


[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7525#section-6.5
[2] https://github.com/yaronf/I-D/pull/279/files
[3] https://cbw.sh/static/pdf/chung-imc18.pdf

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