Issues
------
* tlswg/tls13-spec (+1/-6/💬8)
 1 issues created:
 - Key update a MUST? (by BenSmyth)
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1299
 4 issues received 8 new comments:
 - #1299 Key update a MUST? (2 by BenSmyth, tomato42)
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1299 - #1291 Security considerations of using same cert for TLS client and server (4 by chris-wood, davidben, ekr, karthikbhargavan) https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1291 - #1289 Server Tracking Prevention is also needed (1 by ekr) https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1289 - #1274 Add a changelog from RFC 8446 (1 by ekr) https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1274
 6 issues closed:
- Add more text on authentication https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1284 - Add a changelog from RFC 8446 https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1274 - Too many KeyUpdates risk key collision within a connection https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1257 [PR Pending] - Server Tracking Prevention is also needed https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1289 - Reusing psk identities enables tracking https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1287 - Note that clients should ignore NST if they don't support resumption https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1280


Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/tls13-spec (+3/-6/💬4)
 3 pull requests submitted:
 - Changelog entries (by ekr)
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1298 - Issue1284 auth text (by ekr) https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1297 - Certs plus psk (by ekr) https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1296
 3 pull requests received 4 new comments:
 - #1288  Reusing psk identities enables client and server tracking (1 by ekr)
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1288 [propose-close] - #1270 Update KeyUpdate limits with text from RFC 9147. Fixed #1257 (1 by ekr) https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1270 - #1231 RFC 8773 TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-Based Authentication with … (2 by ekr) https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1231
 6 pull requests merged:
 - Changelog entries
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1298 - Certs plus psk https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1296 - Issue1284 auth text https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1297 - Update KeyUpdate limits with text from RFC 9147. Fixed #1257 https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1270 - Discuss the implications of external PSK reuse. Fixes #1287 https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1294 - Ignore NST if you don't support resumption. Fixes #1280 https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1295
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls (+2/-3/💬0)
 2 pull requests submitted:
 - Removed open issue regarding snake_case to camelCase conversion (by 
hannestschofenig)
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/92 - Moved handshake_framing section (by hannestschofenig) https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/91
 3 pull requests merged:
 - Section "Adding a cTLS Template message type"
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/88 - Moved handshake_framing section https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/91 - Removed open issue regarding snake_case to camelCase conversion https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/92

Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls
* https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team
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