Richard, yes, you git it right. From: Richard Barnes <r...@ipv.sx> Date: Tuesday, March 21, 2023 at 4:32 PM To: Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <u...@ll.mit.edu> Cc: tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] Resurrect AuthKEM? Hi Uri,
Just to be clear, the AuthKEM draft you mean is this one? https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-celi-wiggers-tls-authkem/ Assuming that's the case, in case anyone else is confused (as I was), the "AuthKEM" here does not refer to a KEM implementing the AuthEncap/AuthDecap interface from RFC 9180. Instead it refers to the construction in that document, which uses a normal KEM. --Richard On Tue, Mar 21, 2023 at 2:34 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <u...@ll.mit.edu<mailto:u...@ll.mit.edu>> wrote: I’m surprised to see that there isn’t much (isn’t any?) discussion of the AuthKEM draft. It seems pretty obvious that with the advent of PQ algorithms, the sheer sizes of signatures and public keys would make {cDm}TLS existing authentication and key exchange impractical in bandwidth-constrained environments, especially when higher security-level algorithms (like, what’s demanded by CNSA-2.0) are required. Thus, implicit authentication (think – MQV, Hugo Krawczyk’s HMQV, etc.) seems to be a-must for making the PQ impact on bandwidth somewhat manageable. I would like this WG to resurrect the AuthKEM draft. I can’t be in Yokohama, and am not fanatical enough to spend nights on XMPP or such. But hopefully, we can discuss AuthKEM approach here on the list. Thank you! -- V/R, Uri Blumenthal Voice: (781) 981-1638 Secure Resilient Systems and Technologies Cell: (339) 223-5363 MIT Lincoln Laboratory 244 Wood Street, Lexington, MA 02420-9108 Web: https://www.ll.mit.edu/biographies/uri-blumenthal Root CA: https://www.ll.mit.edu/llrca2.pem There are two ways to design a system. One is to make it so simple there are obviously no deficiencies. The other is to make it so complex there are no obvious deficiencies. - C. A. R. Hoare _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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