Dennis beat me to making the key point about identity :) There are cases where identity misbinding is possible in similar systems. RFC 8844 describes one such case. However, this is not an inherent failing in TLS, but in the usage context. That weakness was not the result of using raw public keys though.
What TLS *says* about this risk is really what we should be considering. It might be enough to say that where TLS does not carry all of the relevant identification information, there is a risk of identity misbinding attacks. This can be mitigated by including additional information about identity in the transcript and checking it for consistency (as RFC 8844 does). On Fri, Mar 29, 2024, at 05:27, Dennis Jackson wrote: > Hi John, > > It depends what you mean by an identity. TLS1.3 ensures the peers agree > on the used RPKs and it doesn't rely on any external proof of > possession to achieve that property. > > How the peers come to trust the RPKs or their corresponding identity is > of necessity left to the application - not dissimilar to how the > application has to decide which root certificates to trust and whether > the leaf certificate is appropriate for the intended connection (e.g. > browsers extract the valid identities from the SAN). > > Best, > Dennis > > On 28/03/2024 15:22, John Mattsson wrote: >> Hi, >> >> I looked into what RFC 8446(bis) says about Raw Public Keys. As correctly >> stated in RFC 8446, TLS 1.3 with signatures and certificates is an >> implementation of SIGMA-I: >> >> SIGMA does however require that the identities of the endpoints (called A >> and B in [SIGMA]) are included in the messages. This is not true for TLS 1.3 >> with RPKs and TLS 1.3 with RPKs is therefore not SIGMA. TLS 1.3 with RPKs is >> vulnerable to what Krawczyk’s SIGMA paper calls misbinding attacks: >> >> “This attack, to which we refer as an “identity misbinding attack”, applies >> to many seemingly natural and intuitive protocols. Avoiding this form of >> attack and guaranteeing a consistent binding between a session key and the >> peers to the session is a central element in the design of SIGMA.” >> >> “Even more significantly we show here that the misbinding attack applies to >> this protocol in any scenario where parties can register public keys without >> proving knowledge of the corresponding signature key.” >> >> As stated in Appendix E.1, at the completion of the handshake, each side >> outputs its view of the identities of the communicating parties. On of the >> TLS 1.3 security properties are “Peer Authentication”, which says that the >> client’s and server’s view of the identities match. TLS 1.3 with PRKs does >> not fulfill this unless the out-of-band mechanism to register public keys >> proved knowledge of the private key. RFC 7250 does not say anything about >> this either. >> >> I think this needs to be clarified in RFC8446bis. The only reason to ever >> use an RPK is in constrained IoT environments. Otherwise a self-signed >> certificate is a much better choice. TLS 1.3 with self-signed certificates >> is SIGMA-I. >> >> It is worrying to find comments like this: >> >> “I'd like to be able to use wireguard/ssh-style authentication for my app. >> This is possible currently with self-signed certificates, but the proper >> solution is RFC 7250, which is also part of TLS 1.3.” >> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6929 >> >> RPKs are not the proper solution. >> >> (Talking about misbinding, does RFC 8446 say anything about how to avoid >> selfie attacks where an entity using PSK authentication ends up talking to >> itself?) >> >> Cheers, >> John Preuß Mattsson >> >> [SIGMA] https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_24 >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
