Usama: During WG Last Call, several people asked for formal analysis, I reached out to one researcher to see if thet formal analysis could be provided in response. I was told the additions were too simple to get a published paper. So, nothing happened.
This response says that formal analysis is needed to advance rfc8773bis to the Standards Track. Other documents in other working groups are using RFC 8773, They are proceeding with a downward reference (that needs to be called out when they reach IETF Last Call). This means that people are implementing RFC 8773. I'll gladly work with you or anyone else on the formal analysis. Russ > On May 31, 2024, at 4:53 AM, Muhammad Usama Sardar > <muhammad_usama.sar...@tu-dresden.de> wrote: >>> I see much more need for analysis when it comes to the authentication >>> properties of the PSK (psk/cert combination), whereas the secrecy (assuming >>> authentication is a non-goal) is much more straightforward. >> >> Who will perform this analysis? I asked a researcher to perform such an >> analysis, and the response was that it is too simple to get a paper. Now >> waht? >> > Russ, if you absolutely find no one, I will be happy to work on it over the > weekends (so it will be slow). Also to clarify, I prefer to work with > ProVerif because in my initial experiments, ProVerif was always way faster > than Tamarin. >>>> For the authentication analysis, I think here a Tamarin-like analysis >>>> might be useful for checking undesirable interactions; for example, could >>>> anything go wrong if a single PSK is used both as a traditional PSK but >>>> also as an external PSK? > Here is why I would like to see at least name of the panelist who wrote this. > If it is Cas, it makes perfect sense to me. If it is someone else, I would > like to know why he would prefer to recommend Tamarin over ProVerif. What > exactly is missing in ProVerif that would make it unsuitable for this > analysis? Or is it some usability issue? > > Best Regards, > > Usama >
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