Hi Ted,

On 02/09/2025 15:40, Ted Hardie wrote:
Hi Stephen,

I have what I hope is a small question about the IANA registration.  In the
protocol description, the draft says:

    The JSON file at the well-known URI MUST contain an object with two
    keys: "regeninterval", whose value is a number, and "endpoints" whose
    value is an array of objects.  All other keys MUST be ignored.

In the IANA considerations for the new JSON Service Binding registry, you
specify Standards Action is required to update the registry.

Ah. I think Standards Action was Ben's choice, or else, apologies to
Ben, and I just forget why we said that;-)

It seems to
me that you actually need something a bit narrower, a Standards Action that
updates or obsoletes this RFC, since other actions wouldn't eliminate the
"MUST be ignored." requirement.

That's logical.

My IANAbis chair hat isn't on for this question, but it does cause me to
think about what folks mean by Standards Action in a case like this; do the
authors assume Standards Action is sufficient, because that process would
check to make sure that the new standard didn't need to make an update to
this RFC?

Yes, I would make that assumption, and it may be worth stating
in the document I guess?

Or... we could consider "loosening" the registry update rule to
expert review with guidance to the expert that they should think
when adding things to that registry as the current setup means
they'll be ignored by existing implementations. (So, not much
point adding negative-things/constraints that need to be honoured
I guess.)

I created a GH issue for this. [1]

Thanks,
S.

[1] https://github.com/sftcd/wkesni/issues/57


Thanks,

Ted Hardie


On Tue, Sep 2, 2025 at 2:40 PM Stephen Farrell <[email protected]>
wrote:


Hiya,

We made a bunch of editorial changes after the comments
received at IETF-123 with which the commenters seem ok,
so the authors would like to ask if the chairs think this
is ready for WGLC. (We understand the plan is to park it
after that awaiting more implementation experience which
is fine.)

There are no outstanding issues or PRs on the git repo. [1]

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://github.com/sftcd/wkesni

On 02/09/2025 14:30, [email protected] wrote:
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-wkech-09.txt is now available. It is a
work item
of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) WG of the IETF.

     Title:   A well-known URI for publishing service parameters
     Authors: Stephen Farrell
              Rich Salz
              Benjamin Schwartz
     Name:    draft-ietf-tls-wkech-09.txt
     Pages:   18
     Dates:   2025-09-02

Abstract:

     We define a well-known URI at which an HTTP origin can inform an
     authoritative DNS server, or other interested parties, about its
     Service Bindings.  Service binding data can include Encrypted
     ClientHello (ECH) configurations, that may change frequently.  This
     allows the origin, in collaboration with DNS infrastructure elements,
     to publish and rotate its own ECH keys.  Other service bindng data
     such as information about TLS supported groups is unlikely to change
     quickly, but the origin is much more likely to have accurate
     information when changes do occur.  Service data published via this
     mechanism is typically available via an HTTPS or SVCB resource
     record.

The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-wkech/

There is also an HTMLized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-wkech-09

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-wkech-09

Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]



Attachment: OpenPGP_signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

Reply via email to