Happy to delete if we can't find a better way to phrase it. On Tue, Oct 28, 2025, 12:13 PM Kris Kwiatkowski <kris= [email protected]> wrote:
> I also think simply deleting the text is the way to go. > > > On October 28, 2025 6:38:55 PM GMT, Bas Westerbaan <bas= > [email protected]> wrote: > >> I concur. >> >> On Tue, Oct 28, 2025 at 6:48 PM Eric Rescorla <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> I concur. I actually had thought we had agreed that the current text >>> shouldn't appear and then there was some attempt to converge on a >>> replacement, but that >>> didn't really work out, so we should just delete it and move forward. >>> >>> -Ekr >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 28, 2025 at 10:24 AM Christopher Patton < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> I'm also in favor of simply deleting the text. >>>> >>>> Chris P. >>>> >>>> On Tue, Oct 28, 2025, 10:19 David Benjamin <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I also agree we should simply delete the text. >>>>> >>>>> It is irrelevant for ML-KEM. While the text says "if other algorithms >>>>> are used", if we ever do consider an algorithm where this matters, we can >>>>> always debate it then, with full context, and put it in *that* document, >>>>> where it would be more likely to be read by implementers anyway. >>>>> >>>>> PS: The formatting in that section is slightly odd. Should "Larger >>>>> public keys and/or ciphertexts", "Duplication of key shares", and >>>>> "Failures" (but delete that one) be subsections? >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Oct 28, 2025 at 5:49 AM Filippo Valsorda < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> 2025-10-28 05:29 GMT+01:00 Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>: >>>>>> >>>>>> > >> I think there is consensus that there is no advise to give to >>>>>> implementers >>>>>> > >> to handle these failure cases. While we could use that to >>>>>> justify saying >>>>>> > >> nothing, my own preference is to at least have a sentence >>>>>> explicitely >>>>>> > >> saying that implementers should do nothing, in case implementers >>>>>> become >>>>>> > >> aware of these theortical failures and wrongly assume the >>>>>> specification >>>>>> > >> was not aware and thus "vulnerable" to these issues. >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> Perhaps: >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> Current: >>>>>> > >> Some post-quantum key exchange algorithms, including ML-KEM >>>>>> > >> [NIST-FIPS-203], have non-zero probability of failure, >>>>>> meaning two >>>>>> > >> honest parties may derive different shared secrets. This >>>>>> would cause a >>>>>> > >> handshake failure. ML-KEM has a cryptographically small >>>>>> failure rate; if >>>>>> > >> other algorithms are used, implementers should be aware of >>>>>> the potential >>>>>> > >> of handshake failure. Clients MAY retry if a failure is >>>>>> encountered. >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> New: >>>>>> > >> Some post-quantum key exchange algorithms, including ML-KEM >>>>>> > >> [NIST-FIPS-203], have non-zero probability of failure, >>>>>> meaning >>>>>> > >> two honest parties may derive different shared secrets. This >>>>>> > >> would cause a handshake failure. As with other similar >>>>>> failures >>>>>> > >> (such as bit corruptions), Clients MAY retry if a failure is >>>>>> > >> encountered. Due to the negliable rate of occurances of these >>>>>> > >> failure events, the lack of a known feasable method and the >>>>>> > >> additional risk of introducing new attack vectors when >>>>>> attempting >>>>>> > >> to handle these events, it is RECOMMENDED for implementers to >>>>>> > >> not specifically handle post-quantum key exchange shared >>>>>> secrets >>>>>> > >> failures, and rely on the pre-existing code paths that handle >>>>>> > >> derivation failures. >>>>>> >>>>>> It was my impression that there was rough consensus to drop the >>>>>> original >>>>>> text and say nothing instead, though the "New" text above is instead >>>>>> an >>>>>> acceptable overly-elaborate way of saying "nothing to see here, move >>>>>> along". >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yeah, it looks to me like there is no consensus on the original text, >>>>>> in fact. Different people have different opinions on what to replace it >>>>>> with, but that doesn't mean there is consensus on the original. I think >>>>>> the >>>>>> bar to ship some text is WG consensus, not lack of consensus on >>>>>> alternatives. Does anyone actually support shipping the original text? >>>>>> >>>>>> Were there any strong objections to saying nothing? All I could see >>>>>> were "we could say nothing, or we could say [text]" which implies support >>>>>> for saying nothing, as well. >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >>>>>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >>>>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >>>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>> >> _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
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