Mohamed Boucadair has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-pkcs1-06: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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Hi David and Andrei,

Thank you for the effort put into this specification.

Updated the ballot [1] to take into account the feedback received so far
(including off-list clarification from Paul; Thanks).

The only pending point is:

# Update RFC8446/RFC8446bis

The provisions in this draft relax what used to be disallowed in 8446/8446bis.
This reads like an update.

Specifically, this part from RFC8446bis:

and

   In addition, the signature algorithm MUST be compatible with the key
   in the sender's end-entity certificate.  RSA signatures MUST use an
   RSASSA-PSS algorithm, regardless of whether RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
   algorithms appear in "signature_algorithms".


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COMMENT:
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# FIPS 186-4

## Please add a reference

## s/with FIPS 186-4/with US FIPS 186-4

# TLS Registries

CURRENT:
   IANA is requested to create the following entries in the TLS
   SignatureScheme registry, defined in [RFC8446].

Isn’t draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis authoritative here for registry matters? I
would replace the 8446 citation with draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis.

Cheers,
Med

[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/dimNOvXqeIaYflBK7s51J43p80U/



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