On 26.01.26 19:36, Eric Rescorla wrote:
Regardless, the argument cannot be "use the webpki because it
offers better privacy features" because for
players in this space, non-webpki authentication and authorization
is more important than a privacy feature
that defends only against passive attacks.
I think you are perhaps misunderstanding my comment, because I'm
not talking about the WebPKI at all in this discussion. I'm instead saying
that the client should send the DNSSEC chain in a TLS extension
rather than having the server query for it, thus avoiding revealing
its identity on the wire. This is entirely isomorphic to the current
identity structure.
Do I understand correctly that you are proposing the DNSSEC chain to be put as an extension of client's Certificate message of TLS 1.3?
-Usama
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
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