Am 20.04.26 um 12:13 schrieb Daniel Van Geest:
The point was that if key reuse is forbidden then there shouldn't be a
way to reference one of the components of a composite key as a
standalone key (via a PKCS#11 token or whatever).  Because if there is a
way to reference one of the components of a composite key as a
standalone key, then inevitably that will be done and non-separability
properties will be lost.
I don't think there is any such risk for composite signatures in TLS. The certificate is part of the authenticated handshake data and defines the public signature key. This means that the implementation would have to validate an RSA (or MLDSA) signature against a composite MLDSA+RSA key and would have much more severe consequences than violating non-separability (the security implications of which are not obvious  per se in any case). That would require a corresponding bug on the protocol level. I hold that being able to address component keys individually in a hardware token cannot be considered a problem in itself.


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