Even with Merkle Tree Certificates, we actually still need this document anyway for the end-entity TLS key, and the CertificateVerify signature it generates.
(I support publication, but I think I've said as much on this thread already.) On Wed, Apr 22, 2026 at 1:14 PM Soatok Dreamseeker <[email protected]> wrote: > I've been working since 2024 on a proposal for Key Transparency for the > Fediverse, as part of an overall goal to ship E2EE for private messages > sent over Mastodon and other Fediverse software. My proposal uses pure > ML-DSA. No composite/hybrid signatures. But my KEM recommendation remains > hybrid-first. > > And, although I think Merkle Tree Certificates are a more realistic way to > get post-quantum auth into TLS than shoving ML-DSA into the incumbent > design, I support the publication. Just because it's published doesn't mean > I have a gun held to my head to actually use it. I wish more of the people > raising objections would consider this important fact. > > On Wed, Apr 22, 2026 at 10:43 AM Sean Turner <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Reminder that this WGLC ends tomorrow. >> >> spt >> >> > On Apr 15, 2026, at 15:07, Sean Turner <[email protected]> wrote: >> > >> > Reminder that this WGLC is still ongoing. >> > >> > spt >> > >> >> On Apr 9, 2026, at 15:30, Sean Turner <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> This is the working group last call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3. >> Please review draft-ietf-tls-mldsa [1] and reply to this thread indicating >> if you think it is ready for publication or not. If you do not think it is >> ready please indicate why. This call will end on April 23, 2026. >> >> >> >> REMINDER: If you have not done so recently, review the TLS WG's Mail >> List Procedures; see [2]. >> >> >> >> The Chairs, >> >> Deirdre, Joe, and Sean >> >> >> >> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-mldsa/ >> >> [2] >> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/ucdImHExlbOf4Q3BCG81gjzi2xE/ >> > >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
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