#21155: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option --------------------------------------+------------------------------ Reporter: Jaym | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Component: - Select a component | Version: Tor: unspecified Severity: Normal | Keywords: Actual Points: | Parent ID: Points: | Reviewer: Sponsor: | --------------------------------------+------------------------------ Hello !
I discovered #14917 while configuring an onion service with the EntryNodes option set. I believe (after checking the tor-0.2.9.8 source code) that a similar problem arises when the EntryNodes option is set AND the operator configures entry nodes that are part of the same family or the same /16. (let's say that the operator configures the service with 2 of its own guard nodes running in the same cloud provider, thinking this move is wise). Then this happens: - When someone use a RDV point of the same family or the same /16 than the onion's guards, then as you said: "entry_list_is_constrained() is true, so populate_live_entry_guards() will happily return an empty list if your one choice is inappropriate, resulting in choose_random_entry_impl() returning NULL". Is there a reason why we do not check family, /16 and user misconfiguration ? "EntryNodes fingerprint1, fingerprint1" works just fine for example. What do you think ? -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21155> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs