#21559: Tor browser deanonymization/fingerprinting via cached intermediate CAs -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: tbb- | team Type: defect | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-linkability | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by cypherpunks): FWIW: 1) It's not an ordinary cache, but just a fallback for misconfigured servers made for "fixing" issues like #2167, #9479, #18218, #19371, but doesn't work as you see, because it's useless for stateless browser and should be disabled. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1334485#c11 2) Mozilla urgently disabled SHA-1 and removed WoSign busters from the root. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1311824#c1 3) PoC successfully stress-tested the network subsystem of Firefox leading to potentially exploitable crash. Cache should be disabled to reduce the surface and check whether it's the root cause. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1334485#c21 -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21559#comment:5> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs