#22400: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live consensus and not enough guards in the state file --------------------------+------------------------------------ Reporter: arma | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.1.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.3.0.7 Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: --------------------------+------------------------------------
Comment (by nickm): Diagnosis: The "Loaded an expired consensus. Discarding" message is a red herring; that is talking about a cached unverified consensus, as evidenced by the next line, "Couldn't load unverified consensus microdesc networkstatus from cache." What's actually going on here is that we _are_ accepting a slightly old consensus. The expiration check is: {{{ if (from_cache && !accept_obsolete && c->valid_until < now-OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE) { log_info(LD_DIR, "Loaded an expired consensus. Discarding."); goto done; } }}} with the relevant constant defined as {{{ #define OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE (60*60*24*5) }}} So, one bug here is that a really old unverified consensus got left around. We have a ticket for that from 2011 (#4187)! One other bug is that we're expanding our guard sample even though the consensus is a few days out of date. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22400#comment:10> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs