#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending) -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: asn | Owner: dgoulet Type: defect | Status: | needs_information Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: | unspecified Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: tor-hs needs-insight needs- | Actual Points: diagnosis | Parent ID: | Points: 1 Reviewer: | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by s7r): All this makes sense to me, except I cannot help to ask myself the following questions: From all the relays I run, I see this warning on just one of them only, I see it heavily and the relay in question is an Exit relay with very low consensus weight (200 - 350). For example in 11 days and 18 hours of uptime for Tor, the warning is logged exactly 112 times. A *custom* client triggering this simply cannot pick this particular relay so so many times in short periods, especially given its low consensus weight and especially that it is an Exit relay so it shouldn't even be used in the RP position anyway. If the *custom* client is over-picking this relay in a position (RP) that it shouldn't be given its flags, and it does not respect the load balancing logic by picking based on consensus weights, we want to know why. A regular client affected by #21084 should just be using Tor so certainly it is at least questionable if it would choose a relay with low consensus weight, with the Exit flag in the RP position for so many times on a short period of time. Good thinking about the downgrade from warn to proto warn - I strongly support leaving this at warning level at least until we fix/confirm #21084. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618#comment:29> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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