#23126: HSDirs should publish some count about new-style onion addresses -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: arma | Owner: (none) Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: | 0.3.2.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: prop224, tor-hs, prop224-extra, | Actual Points: research | Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by asn): So a very very basic statistic here that would give us an idea of the adoption of HSv3 services could be: a) When a time period completes, every relay '''publishes the number of HSv3 blinded keys''' it saw during the previous time period in its extra- info desc. Relays also add some laplace noise to obfuscate the original number. Time periods start at 12:00 UTC and last 24 hours, so relays can publish this statistic once per day. b) After we have received all descriptors containing stats from a specific time period, we add all the ''unique blinded key counts'' together, and publish the aggregate count. We add everything together to remove the laplace noise, and also to get a final graphable number. Unfortunately, that final number is not the number of unique HSv3 services since HSes publish their HS on multiple HSDirs under the same blinded key. However this number is definitely related to the number of unique HSes, by noticing how this number moves over time, we can certainly spot adoption rates of HSv3 services. This is a very basic stat that could help us here. Furthermore, we can then deploy similar analysis to what we did for the unique v2 .onion counts, to weed out the duplicate HSes so that we get a more accurate number. And I guess we can use privcount etc. to get an even more accurate number. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23126#comment:3> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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