#10969: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: asn | Owner: | mikeperry Type: defect | Status: closed Priority: High | Milestone: Tor: | unspecified Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: fixed Keywords: tor-client, tor-guard, XKEYSCORE, | Actual Points: prop259, SponsorU-deferred, QUICKANT | Parent ID: | Points: large Reviewer: | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by teor): Replying to [comment:42 isis]: > Replying to [comment:41 cypherpunks]: > > Replying to [comment:40 cypherpunks]: > > > Hi isis, I'm again reopening this ticket because the fundamental problem in the title and description ("set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint") remains unfixed. ... > > > I just checked a friend's laptop (Debian stable, tor 0.2.9.11-1~deb9u1) and when it got online it immediately connected to four guards. I don't know why, but I suspect it's because (like most laptops) it is sometimes not connected to the internet. (Some time later, it remained connected to two of them.) > > > > Sorry but that doesn't disprove what Isis said, Prop271 was implemented in Tor 0.3.0.x and not 0.2.9.x which your laptop's friend had. It is likely that at least 2 of the 4 "guards" are: * directory authorities * fallback directory mirrors * directory guards That's why your client disconnected from 2 of them after downloading the consensus, certificates, and descriptors. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10969#comment:43> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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