#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending) -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: asn | Owner: dgoulet Type: defect | Status: | needs_information Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: | unspecified Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: tor-hs needs-insight needs- | Actual Points: diagnosis | Parent ID: | Points: 1 Reviewer: | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by s7r): Replying to [comment:34 dgoulet]: > Hey s7r! You seems to have DEBUG logs there, you think you can attach them (or send them to me private if sensitive) to me. I would like to see a bit more of the inners of tor service side for this? > Yes I have :) been hunting this for some time now. Was lucky to catch it live so immediately switched to debug log level. Got about 2 GB of debug logs (uncompressed). I will send them to you via a secure channel, first because they might be sensitive for whoever was using this relay and second because I feel something very strange is going on and I don't want to tip anyone off which relays keep eyes on this. > The fact that we see that "sometimes" and we see it in burst tells me that it is likely someone doing that either on purpose or a VERY buggy implementation. The tor client can't open 300 circuit to a service in a relatively short amount of time and all have the bug for those... seems VERY unlikely, we would see that more often. > > Those 300 warnings are spread out how over time? Indeed I would say VERY VERY unlikely. It's maybe more than that, in less than 24 hours. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618#comment:35> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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