#17228: Consideration for disabling referrers within TBB --------------------------------------+-------------------------- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: tbb-team Type: defect | Status: new Priority: High | Milestone: Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: --------------------------------------+--------------------------
Comment (by cypherpunks): @ gk cane recommends setting network.http.referer.XOriginPolicy=2. Why don't you agree on his recommendation? The current state means that Tor/Tails users are easily identified as such simply by the referer (e.g. by coming from the Tails startpage). I know Tor users can also be identified as such by looking up the IP addresses of the exit nodes. But storing and analyzing referers should be more common for website operators than cross- referencing website visitors' IP addresses with the publicy known Tor exit nodes addresses. There should be no obvious flag like 'Hey! I'm just arriving on your website, coming from Tails' startpage! I'm a Tor/Tails user! Now you know, without any sophisticated effort!'. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17228#comment:10> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs