#26620: Tor Relay Guide: relays operators shouldn't expose their fine-grained monitoring graphs public ------------------------------+------------------------ Reporter: ggus | Owner: Nusenu Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Component: Community/Relays | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: ------------------------------+------------------------
Comment (by teor): Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]: > please provide examples or be more detailed in your description (e.g. do you mean real time monitoring data or screenshots of them) Real-time monitoring data, real-time graphs, and screenshots of detailed historical data are all bad for user privacy. In more detail: * Currently, public bandwidth reporting over any period less than 24 hours provides less security than tor bandwidth statistics. * Reporting individual relays is worse than reporting totals for groups of relays. In future, we will securely aggregate Tor's bandwidth statistics, so any individual relay bandwidth reporting will be less secure than Tor's statistics. * Smaller periods are worse. * Numbers are worse than graphs. * Real-time data is worse than historical data. * Data in categories (IP version, in/out, etc.) is worse than total data. If they want to report bandwidth, operators should aggregate all their relays' bandwidths over at least a week, then round to the nearest 10 terabytes. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26620#comment:2> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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