#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features -------------------------------------------+--------------------------- Reporter: isabela | Owner: antonela Type: project | Status: assigned Priority: High | Milestone: Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201811 | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor17 -------------------------------------------+---------------------------
Comment (by antonela): Based on last meeting discussions: **2.1.2 Showing Security Slider State** Doorhanger, icon and about:preferences#privacy https://marvelapp.com/a66fg97/screen/50307815 **2.1.2.X Change Security Level and Restart to Apply Changes** I made two options for this, and i think we may need to consider a third one too. If a user is downgrading their security level, then we can have one of this options: - a] a micro button - b] a top stripe alert If a user is upgrading, I'm not sure if the previous options are strong enough to encourage users to restart. If jumping the restart will put users in risk, then we can consider having a full-page warning. a] downgrade, safest → safer https://marvelapp.com/a66fg97/screen/50342988 b] downgrade, safest → safer https://marvelapp.com/a66fg97/screen/50342987 **2.2 Dealing with Per-Site Security Settings - only safer and safest mode** Users will be able to enable `javascript` and `active content` per site, only on safer and safest mode. They can easily switch them at the Control Center. https://marvelapp.com/a66fg97/screen/50307825 **3.x Restore Default Security Settings** All features in `firefox:preferences` have a short (two lines) description about how they work. I included a draft copy there and also the default `Restore Defaults` button. https://marvelapp.com/a66fg97/screen/50343707 -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25658#comment:55> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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