#28358: Nyx forces Tor error: sandbox_getaddrinfo(): Bug: (Sandbox) failed to get address --------------------------+------------------------------------ Reporter: wagon | Owner: (none) Type: defect | Status: closed Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.4.0.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.3.4.9 Severity: Normal | Resolution: fixed Keywords: sandbox | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: dgoulet | Sponsor: --------------------------+------------------------------------
Comment (by wagon): > Did some modification to make it work Let me ask more. As I see it [[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/doc/tor.1.txt|here]], > When the `Sandbox` is 1, the following options can not be changed when tor is running: > ... > `ClientOnionAuthDir` (and any files in it won't reload on HUP signal). > Launching new Onion Services through the control port is not supported with current syscall sandboxing implementation. Does it mean that onionshare-like utilities will not work with sandboxed Tor? So, users have to choose to either (1) run Tor in insecure way with working secure file sharing or (2) run Tor in a secure way without file sharing at all. Sounds not good. What are the exact restrictions on v3 onions? So, on the fly: 1. Auth for already existing onion services (added via filesystem) cannot be added, deleted or changed through `ControlPort` or through files (both on client side and on server side). 3. New onion service (server side) cannot be added by either method: through files or through `Controlport`. 4. No any means to deactivate already running onion service (on server side). Is it correct? In other words, no any change to configuration of onion service can be done on the fly (both on client side and on server side). -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28358#comment:11> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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