#29665: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP 
circuits
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  dgoulet  |      Owner:  (none)
         Type:  defect   |     Status:  new
     Priority:  High     |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
    Component:  Core     |    Version:
  Tor/Tor                |   Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-relay, 029-backport,
     Severity:  Normal   |  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:  0.1      |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:           |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Thanks to a single onion service operator on IRC in the #tor channel
 (`slingamn`), armadev and I were able to identify this issue.

 Any clients connecting to a single onion service and then being idle for
 60 seconds would get disconnected as in the rendezvous circuit closed.

 It turns out that the rendezvous point closes the service circuit through
 this function `circuit_expire_old_circuits_serversid()` if is idle for
 more than 60 seconds (only for single onion service). The faulty condition
 is:

 {{{
     if (or_circ->p_chan && channel_is_client(or_circ->p_chan) &&
         !circ->n_chan &&
         !or_circ->n_streams && !or_circ->resolving_streams &&
         channel_when_last_xmit(or_circ->p_chan) <= cutoff) {
 }}}

 The RP is the end of the service circuit (`or_circ`), all data is spliced
 to the client circuit which makes it that `n_streams` and `n_chan` are
 NULL and thus validating the condition.

 Also possible to hit this if `channel_is_client()` is a false positive for
 the exit point.

 The fix here is to check if the circuit being looked at is a rendezvous
 point and ignore it if so. The `or_circ->rend_splice` should be non-NULL
 if so.

 This needs to be backported and affects v2 and v3 hidden service.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29665>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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