#32678: Tor's DNS cache leaks information --------------------------+------------------------ Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: (none) Type: defect | Status: new Priority: Medium | Milestone: Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: --------------------------+------------------------
Comment (by pulls): The hotness threshold sounds like a great idea. It should be randomized in such a way that an attacker cannot predict the threshold for a given entry in the cache at the time it gets added to the cache. If all entries in a cache share the same threshold, then it's trivial for the attacker to probe this using a domain it controls. If the threshold does not change each time the same domain is added to the cache at a relay, then the attacker can probe it as well. (I guess this is what was meant above, just spelling it out.) Another issue is if an attacker can detect when a entry expires from the cache. If the TTL calculation is deterministic, like now set to one hour, it tells you when the entry was visited at the exit. Probably want to randomize this as well in the order of at least a few minutes (up, never down). -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32678#comment:3> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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