#25723: Multiplex - one client splits traffic across multiple proxies --------------------------------------------+-------------------------- Reporter: dcf | Owner: dcf Type: defect | Status: assigned Priority: Low | Milestone: Component: Circumvention/Snowflake | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1 | Actual Points: Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: --------------------------------------------+--------------------------
Comment (by dcf): Replying to [comment:2 uiouio27]: > Does that mean that the required feature is covered? As far as I understand, that would switch the connection when a proxy leaves but not when it is very slow. Would it be still convenient to utilize several proxies but coordinately and congestion-based sending traffic to them? Good question. The multiplexing described in that document is simpler than what this ticket is about. You are correct that the failover only helps when a proxy dies, not when it is slow. But also, there's no way for a client to use, say, two 50 KB/s proxies as a single 100 KB/s channel—you can only use one at a time. The problem is that the bridge would be getting two streams of data and would not know how they should be interleaved. But beyond that, while it's true a client manages a pool of proxies with the goal of switching between them, currently it doesn't work. After the first proxy dies, there's no way for the client to switch over to another proxy and resume the session. See #29206 and https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-censorship- team/2020-February/000059.html for how we are adding a meta-protocol to make it possible to recover a session after a proxy dies, and make use of multiple proxies at once. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25723#comment:4> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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