#33650: Verify that intro2 cell extensions actually work -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: arma | Owner: | mikeperry Type: task | Status: | accepted Priority: Medium | Milestone: Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: tor-dos tor-dos-2020 anonymous- | Actual Points: credentials research | Parent ID: | Points: Reviewer: | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by mikeperry): Notes for the INTRO1->INTRO2 codepaths: - Intro1 is sent from `hs_circ_send_introduce1()`, and built in `hs_cell_build_introduce1()` - There are actually two extension areas: one is in the unencrypted section, set in `hs_cell_build_introduce1()`, and one is in the encrypted section, set in `introduce1_set_encrypted()` - The Intropoint processes the INTRO1 cell in `hs_intro_received_introduce1()` - v3 INTRO1 cells go into `handle_introduce1()` and the cell's unencrypted fields are parsed and validated - Requested rate limits are checked in `hs_dos_can_send_intro2()` - The cell is sent as an INTRO2 exactly as is towards the service - The service receives it in `hs_service_receive_introduce2()` - The service checks the IP in `service_handle_introduce2()`, and if valid, parses the cell in `hs_circ_handle_introduce2()` (via `hs_cell_parse_introduce2()` and ultimately the intro1 parsing functions) - If parsing was successful, a rend circuit is launched from `hs_circ_handle_introduce2()` -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33650#comment:5> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online
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