#16943: Implement prop250 (Random Number Generation During Tor Voting)
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Reporter: asn | Owner: dgoulet
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_revision
Priority: High | Milestone: Tor:
Component: Core Tor/Tor | 0.2.9.x-final
Severity: Normal | Version:
Keywords: tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201605 | Resolution:
Parent ID: #8244 | Actual Points:
Reviewer: nickm | Points: large
| Sponsor: SponsorR-must
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Comment (by asn):
Here is some TODO from my meeting notes:
- Commit `prop250: Only trust known authority when computing SRV` seems to
reject votes that contain commits by unknown dirauths. This can happen
naturally in the network. Instead of handling unknonw commits during
parsing in `extract_shared_random_commits()` maybe we should handle them
in `should_keep_commit()`.
- I got this message on my notice level logs:
{{{[notice] SR: State loaded successfully from file
/home/user/data_directory/sr-state}}}.
I think this message should be demoted to a lesser severity.
- It would be nice for debugging, to order commits in votes based on
authority fpr, so that they are all in the same order in different votes.
If it's too hard, let's not do that.
- We discussed treating SRVs in votes the same way we treat consensus
parameters. That is, not needing a real majority, and if at least 3
dirauths agree on the same SRV on their votes, it is copied on the
consensus. This is controversial security-wise, so it needs some thinking.
- Make a state diagram of the SRV protocol for greater understanding. We
already have one in the bottom of the
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorNotes notes page],
but we might be able to make a better one.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16943#comment:65>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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