commit 7e91eb83d84b2fd3992c3c4bba49ffd0acb5db08
Merge: 22e240314 a4930de5e
Author: Nick Mathewson <ni...@torproject.org>
Date: Fri Sep 7 08:45:10 2018 -0400
Merge branch 'maint-0.3.4'
changes/bug27463 | 3 +++
changes/bug27465 | 5 +++++
src/feature/rend/rendclient.c | 9 +++++++++
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --cc src/feature/rend/rendclient.c
index 2c4cec65b,000000000..0efeb3b77
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c
@@@ -1,1220 -1,0 +1,1229 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file rendclient.c
+ * \brief Client code to access location-hidden services.
+ **/
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "feature/client/circpathbias.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+#include "core/or/circuituse.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/or/connection_edge.h"
+#include "feature/control/control.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "feature/dircache/directory.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_client.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_common.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/main.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "core/or/relay.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rendclient.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h"
+#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerset.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+
+#include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h"
+#include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/entry_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
+#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rend_intro_point_st.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rend_service_descriptor_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
+
+static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(
+ const rend_cache_entry_t *rend_query,
+ const int strict, const int warnings);
+
+/** Purge all potentially remotely-detectable state held in the hidden
+ * service client code. Called on SIGNAL NEWNYM. */
+void
+rend_client_purge_state(void)
+{
+ rend_cache_purge();
+ rend_cache_failure_purge();
+ rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches();
+ hs_purge_last_hid_serv_requests();
+}
+
+/** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point:
+ * send the introduction request. */
+void
+rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath);
+
+ log_info(LD_REND,"introcirc is open");
+ connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
+}
+
+/** Send the establish-rendezvous cell along a rendezvous circuit. if
+ * it fails, mark the circ for close and return -1. else return 0.
+ */
+static int
+rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
+ tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Sending an ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell");
+
+ crypto_rand(circ->rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
+
+ /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it,
+ * and the rend cookie also means we've used the circ. */
+ circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+
+ /* We've attempted to use this circuit. Probe it if we fail */
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
+
+ if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
+ RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS,
+ circ->rend_data->rend_cookie,
+ REND_COOKIE_LEN,
+ circ->cpath->prev)<0) {
+ /* circ is already marked for close */
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't send ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Called when we're trying to connect an ap conn; sends an INTRODUCE1 cell
+ * down introcirc if possible.
+ */
+int
+rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
+ origin_circuit_t *rendcirc)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ size_t payload_len;
+ int r, v3_shift = 0;
+ char payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+ char tmp[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+ rend_cache_entry_t *entry = NULL;
+ crypt_path_t *cpath;
+ off_t dh_offset;
+ crypto_pk_t *intro_key = NULL;
+ int status = 0;
+ const char *onion_address;
+
+ tor_assert(introcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
+ tor_assert(rendcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
+ tor_assert(introcirc->rend_data);
+ tor_assert(rendcirc->rend_data);
+
tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data_get_address(introcirc->rend_data),
+
rend_data_get_address(rendcirc->rend_data)));
+ assert_circ_anonymity_ok(introcirc, options);
+ assert_circ_anonymity_ok(rendcirc, options);
+ onion_address = rend_data_get_address(introcirc->rend_data);
+
+ r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &entry);
+ /* An invalid onion address is not possible else we have a big issue. */
+ tor_assert(r != -EINVAL);
+ if (r < 0 || !rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) {
+ /* If the descriptor is not found or the intro points are not usable
+ * anymore, trigger a fetch. */
+ log_info(LD_REND,
+ "query %s didn't have valid rend desc in cache. "
+ "Refetching descriptor.",
+ safe_str_client(onion_address));
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(introcirc->rend_data);
+ {
+ connection_t *conn;
+
+ while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP,
+ AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT, onion_address))) {
+ connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn));
+ conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ status = -1;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of the service's pk */
+ intro_key = NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
+ intro, {
+ if (tor_memeq(introcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
+ intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ intro_key = intro->intro_key;
+ break;
+ }
+ });
+ if (!intro_key) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Could not find intro key for %s at %s; we "
+ "have a v2 rend desc with %d intro points. "
+ "Trying a different intro point...",
+ safe_str_client(onion_address),
+ safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(
+ introcirc->build_state->chosen_exit)),
+ smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes));
+
+ if (hs_client_reextend_intro_circuit(introcirc)) {
+ status = -2;
+ goto perm_err;
+ } else {
+ status = -1;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, payload)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key.");
+ status = -2;
+ goto perm_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the pending_final_cpath and start the DH handshake. */
+ cpath = rendcirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
+ if (!cpath) {
+ cpath = rendcirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath =
+ tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
+ cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
+ if (!(cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND))) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't allocate DH.");
+ status = -2;
+ goto perm_err;
+ }
+ if (crypto_dh_generate_public(cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't generate g^x.");
+ status = -2;
+ goto perm_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If version is 3, write (optional) auth data and timestamp. */
+ if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<3)) {
+ tmp[0] = 3; /* version 3 of the cell format */
+ /* auth type, if any */
+ tmp[1] = (uint8_t) TO_REND_DATA_V2(introcirc->rend_data)->auth_type;
+ v3_shift = 1;
+ if (tmp[1] != REND_NO_AUTH) {
+ set_uint16(tmp+2, htons(REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN));
+ memcpy(tmp+4, TO_REND_DATA_V2(introcirc->rend_data)->descriptor_cookie,
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ v3_shift += 2+REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN;
+ }
+ /* Once this held a timestamp. */
+ set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, 0);
+ v3_shift += 4;
+ } /* if version 2 only write version number */
+ else if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<2)) {
+ tmp[0] = 2; /* version 2 of the cell format */
+ }
+
+ /* write the remaining items into tmp */
+ if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<3) || entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<2))
{
+ /* version 2 format */
+ extend_info_t *extend_info = rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit;
+ int klen;
+ /* nul pads */
+ set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&extend_info->addr));
+ set_uint16(tmp+v3_shift+5, htons(extend_info->port));
+ memcpy(tmp+v3_shift+7, extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ klen = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(extend_info->onion_key,
+ tmp+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2,
+ sizeof(tmp)-(v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2));
+ if (klen < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: can't encode public key.");
+ status = -2;
+ goto perm_err;
+ }
+ set_uint16(tmp+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN, htons(klen));
+ memcpy(tmp+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen, rendcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie,
+ REND_COOKIE_LEN);
+ dh_offset = v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen+REND_COOKIE_LEN;
+ } else {
+ /* Version 0. */
++
++ /* Some compilers are smart enough to work out that nickname can be more
++ * than 19 characters, when it's a hexdigest. They warn that strncpy()
++ * will truncate hexdigests without NUL-terminating them. But we only put
++ * hexdigests in HSDir and general circuit exits. */
++ if (BUG(strlen(rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname)
++ > MAX_NICKNAME_LEN)) {
++ goto perm_err;
++ }
+ strncpy(tmp, rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname,
+ (MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)); /* nul pads */
+ memcpy(tmp+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1, rendcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie,
+ REND_COOKIE_LEN);
+ dh_offset = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN;
+ }
+
+ if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state, tmp+dh_offset,
+ DH1024_KEY_LEN)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't extract g^x.");
+ status = -2;
+ goto perm_err;
+ }
+
+ /*XXX maybe give crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt a max_len arg,
+ * to avoid buffer overflows? */
+ r = crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(intro_key, payload+DIGEST_LEN,
+ sizeof(payload)-DIGEST_LEN,
+ tmp,
+ (int)(dh_offset+DH1024_KEY_LEN),
+ PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
+ if (r<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: hybrid pk encrypt failed.");
+ status = -2;
+ goto perm_err;
+ }
+
+ payload_len = DIGEST_LEN + r;
+ tor_assert(payload_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE); /* we overran something */
+
+ /* Copy the rendezvous cookie from rendcirc to introcirc, so that
+ * when introcirc gets an ack, we can change the state of the right
+ * rendezvous circuit. */
+ memcpy(introcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie, rendcirc->rend_data->rend_cookie,
+ REND_COOKIE_LEN);
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Sending an INTRODUCE1 cell");
+ if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc),
+ RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1,
+ payload, payload_len,
+ introcirc->cpath->prev)<0) {
+ /* introcirc is already marked for close. leave rendcirc alone. */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't send INTRODUCE1 cell");
+ status = -2;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */
+ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc),
+ CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT);
+ /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it
+ * to specify when a circuit entered the _C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT
+ * state. */
+ introcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(introcirc);
+
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ perm_err:
+ if (!introcirc->base_.marked_for_close)
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
+ cleanup:
+ memwipe(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
+ memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/** Called when a rendezvous circuit is open; sends a establish
+ * rendezvous circuit as appropriate. */
+void
+rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
+
+ log_info(LD_REND,"rendcirc is open");
+
+ /* generate a rendezvous cookie, store it in circ */
+ if (rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(circ) < 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Called to close other intro circuits we launched in parallel.
+ */
+static void
+rend_client_close_other_intros(const uint8_t *rend_pk_digest)
+{
+ /* abort parallel intro circs, if any */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, c) {
+ if ((c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING ||
+ c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) &&
+ !c->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) {
+ origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(c);
+ if (oc->rend_data &&
+ rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, rend_pk_digest)) {
+ log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Closing introduction circuit %d that we "
+ "built in parallel (Purpose %d).", oc->global_identifier,
+ c->purpose);
+ circuit_mark_for_close(c, END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c);
+}
+
+/** Called when get an ACK or a NAK for a REND_INTRODUCE1 cell.
+ */
+int
+rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ origin_circuit_t *rendcirc;
+ (void) request; // XXXX Use this.
+
+ tor_assert(circ->build_state);
+ tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit);
+ assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circ, options);
+ tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
+
+ if (request_len == 0) {
+ /* It's an ACK; the introduction point relayed our introduction request.
*/
+ /* Locate the rend circ which is waiting to hear about this ack,
+ * and tell it.
+ */
+ log_info(LD_REND,"Received ack. Telling rend circ...");
+ rendcirc = circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(circ->rend_data);
+ if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */
+ assert_circ_anonymity_ok(rendcirc, options);
+ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc),
+ CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED);
+ /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects
+ * it to specify when a circuit entered the
+ * _C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED state. */
+ rendcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_REND,"...Found no rend circ. Dropping on the floor.");
+ }
+ /* close the circuit: we won't need it anymore. */
+ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
+ CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED);
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+
+ /* close any other intros launched in parallel */
+ rend_client_close_other_intros(rend_data_get_pk_digest(circ->rend_data,
+ NULL));
+ } else {
+ /* It's a NAK; the introduction point didn't relay our request. */
+ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
+ /* Remove this intro point from the set of viable introduction
+ * points. If any remain, extend to a new one and try again.
+ * If none remain, refetch the service descriptor.
+ */
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Got nack for %s from %s...",
+ safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(circ->rend_data)),
+
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit)));
+ if (rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(circ->build_state->chosen_exit,
+ circ->rend_data,
+ INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC)>0) {
+ /* There are introduction points left. Re-extend the circuit to
+ * another intro point and try again. */
+ int result = hs_client_reextend_intro_circuit(circ);
+ /* XXXX If that call failed, should we close the rend circuit,
+ * too? */
+ return result;
+ } else {
+ /* Close circuit because no more intro points are usable thus not
+ * useful anymore. Change it's purpose before so we don't report an
+ * intro point failure again triggering an extra descriptor fetch. */
+ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
+ CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED);
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Determine the responsible hidden service directories for <b>desc_id</b>
+ * and fetch the descriptor with that ID from one of them. Only
+ * send a request to a hidden service directory that we have not yet tried
+ * during this attempt to connect to this hidden service; on success, return
1,
+ * in the case that no hidden service directory is left to ask for the
+ * descriptor, return 0, and in case of a failure -1. */
+static int
+directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id,
+ const rend_data_t *rend_query,
+ routerstatus_t *rs_hsdir)
+{
+ routerstatus_t *hs_dir = rs_hsdir;
+ char *hsdir_fp;
+ char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
+ char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64];
+ const rend_data_v2_t *rend_data;
+ const int how_to_fetch = DIRIND_ANONYMOUS;
+
+ tor_assert(desc_id);
+ tor_assert(rend_query);
+ rend_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_query);
+
+ base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32),
+ desc_id, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ /* Automatically pick an hs dir if none given. */
+ if (!rs_hsdir) {
+ /* Determine responsible dirs. Even if we can't get all we want, work with
+ * the ones we have. If it's empty, we'll notice in hs_pick_hsdir(). */
+ smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
+ hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(responsible_dirs, desc_id);
+
+ hs_dir = hs_pick_hsdir(responsible_dirs, desc_id_base32);
+ if (!hs_dir) {
+ /* No suitable hs dir can be found, stop right now. */
+ control_event_hsv2_descriptor_failed(rend_query, NULL,
+ "QUERY_NO_HSDIR");
+ control_event_hs_descriptor_content(rend_data_get_address(rend_query),
+ desc_id_base32, NULL, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Add a copy of the HSDir identity digest to the query so we can track it
+ * on the control port. */
+ hsdir_fp = tor_memdup(hs_dir->identity_digest,
+ sizeof(hs_dir->identity_digest));
+ smartlist_add(rend_query->hsdirs_fp, hsdir_fp);
+
+ /* Encode descriptor cookie for logging purposes. Also, if the cookie is
+ * malformed, no fetch is triggered thus this needs to be done before the
+ * fetch request. */
+ if (rend_data->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
+ if (base64_encode(descriptor_cookie_base64,
+ sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64),
+ rend_data->descriptor_cookie,
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN,
+ 0)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
+ control_event_hsv2_descriptor_failed(rend_query, hsdir_fp, "BAD_DESC");
+ control_event_hs_descriptor_content(rend_data_get_address(rend_query),
+ desc_id_base32, hsdir_fp, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Remove == signs. */
+ descriptor_cookie_base64[strlen(descriptor_cookie_base64)-2] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ strlcpy(descriptor_cookie_base64, "(none)",
+ sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64));
+ }
+
+ /* Send fetch request. (Pass query and possibly descriptor cookie so that
+ * they can be written to the directory connection and be referred to when
+ * the response arrives. */
+ directory_request_t *req =
+ directory_request_new(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2);
+ directory_request_set_routerstatus(req, hs_dir);
+ directory_request_set_indirection(req, how_to_fetch);
+ directory_request_set_resource(req, desc_id_base32);
+ directory_request_set_rend_query(req, rend_query);
+ directory_initiate_request(req);
+ directory_request_free(req);
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Sending fetch request for v2 descriptor for "
+ "service '%s' with descriptor ID '%s', auth type %d, "
+ "and descriptor cookie '%s' to hidden service "
+ "directory %s",
+ rend_data->onion_address, desc_id_base32,
+ rend_data->auth_type,
+ (rend_data->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH ? "[none]" :
+ escaped_safe_str_client(descriptor_cookie_base64)),
+ routerstatus_describe(hs_dir));
+ control_event_hs_descriptor_requested(rend_data->onion_address,
+ rend_data->auth_type,
+ hs_dir->identity_digest,
+ desc_id_base32, NULL);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Remove tracked HSDir requests from our history for this hidden service
+ * descriptor <b>desc_id</b> (of size DIGEST_LEN) */
+static void
+purge_v2_hidserv_req(const char *desc_id)
+{
+ char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
+
+ /* The hsdir request tracker stores v2 keys using the base32 encoded
+ desc_id. Do it: */
+ base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32), desc_id,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ hs_purge_hid_serv_from_last_hid_serv_requests(desc_id_base32);
+}
+
+/** Fetch a v2 descriptor using the given descriptor id. If any hsdir(s) are
+ * given, they will be used instead.
+ *
+ * On success, 1 is returned. If no hidden service is left to ask, return 0.
+ * On error, -1 is returned. */
+static int
+fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(const char *desc_id,
+ const rend_data_t *rend_query, smartlist_t *hsdirs)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ tor_assert(rend_query);
+
+ if (!hsdirs) {
+ ret = directory_get_from_hs_dir(desc_id, rend_query, NULL);
+ goto end; /* either success or failure, but we're done */
+ }
+
+ /* Using the given hsdir list, trigger a fetch on each of them. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(hsdirs, routerstatus_t *, hs_dir) {
+ /* This should always be a success. */
+ ret = directory_get_from_hs_dir(desc_id, rend_query, hs_dir);
+ tor_assert(ret);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(hs_dir);
+
+ /* Everything went well. */
+ ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/** Fetch a v2 descriptor using the onion address in the given query object.
+ * This will compute the descriptor id for each replicas and fetch it on the
+ * given hsdir(s) if any or the responsible ones that are chosen
+ * automatically.
+ *
+ * On success, 1 is returned. If no hidden service is left to ask, return 0.
+ * On error, -1 is returned. */
+static int
+fetch_v2_desc_by_addr(rend_data_t *rend_query, smartlist_t *hsdirs)
+{
+ char descriptor_id[DIGEST_LEN];
+ int replicas_left_to_try[REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS];
+ int i, tries_left, ret;
+ rend_data_v2_t *rend_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_query);
+
+ /* Randomly iterate over the replicas until a descriptor can be fetched
+ * from one of the consecutive nodes, or no options are left. */
+ for (i = 0; i < REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS; i++) {
+ replicas_left_to_try[i] = i;
+ }
+
+ tries_left = REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS;
+ while (tries_left > 0) {
+ int rand_val = crypto_rand_int(tries_left);
+ int chosen_replica = replicas_left_to_try[rand_val];
+ replicas_left_to_try[rand_val] = replicas_left_to_try[--tries_left];
+
+ ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(descriptor_id,
+ rend_data->onion_address,
+ rend_data->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH ?
+ rend_data->descriptor_cookie : NULL,
+ time(NULL), chosen_replica);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /* Normally, on failure the descriptor_id is untouched but let's be
+ * safe in general in case the function changes at some point. */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (tor_memcmp(descriptor_id, rend_data->descriptor_id[chosen_replica],
+ sizeof(descriptor_id)) != 0) {
+ /* Not equal from what we currently have so purge the last hid serv
+ * request cache and update the descriptor ID with the new value. */
+ purge_v2_hidserv_req(rend_data->descriptor_id[chosen_replica]);
+ memcpy(rend_data->descriptor_id[chosen_replica], descriptor_id,
+ sizeof(rend_data->descriptor_id[chosen_replica]));
+ }
+
+ /* Trigger the fetch with the computed descriptor ID. */
+ ret = fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(descriptor_id, rend_query, hsdirs);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* Either on success or failure, as long as we tried a fetch we are
+ * done here. */
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we come here, there are no hidden service directories left. */
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Could not pick one of the responsible hidden "
+ "service directories to fetch descriptors, because "
+ "we already tried them all unsuccessfully.");
+ ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+ memwipe(descriptor_id, 0, sizeof(descriptor_id));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/** Fetch a v2 descriptor using the given query. If any hsdir are specified,
+ * use them for the fetch.
+ *
+ * On success, 1 is returned. If no hidden service is left to ask, return 0.
+ * On error, -1 is returned. */
+int
+rend_client_fetch_v2_desc(rend_data_t *query, smartlist_t *hsdirs)
+{
+ int ret;
+ rend_data_v2_t *rend_data;
+ const char *onion_address;
+
+ tor_assert(query);
+
+ /* Get the version 2 data structure of the query. */
+ rend_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(query);
+ onion_address = rend_data_get_address(query);
+
+ /* Depending on what's available in the rend data query object, we will
+ * trigger a fetch by HS address or using a descriptor ID. */
+
+ if (onion_address[0] != '\0') {
+ ret = fetch_v2_desc_by_addr(query, hsdirs);
+ } else if (!tor_digest_is_zero(rend_data->desc_id_fetch)) {
+ ret = fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(rend_data->desc_id_fetch, query,
+ hsdirs);
+ } else {
+ /* Query data is invalid. */
+ ret = -1;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/** Unless we already have a descriptor for <b>rend_query</b> with at least
+ * one (possibly) working introduction point in it, start a connection to a
+ * hidden service directory to fetch a v2 rendezvous service descriptor. */
+void
+rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data_t *rend_query)
+{
+ rend_cache_entry_t *e = NULL;
+ const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_query);
+
+ tor_assert(rend_query);
+ /* Before fetching, check if we already have a usable descriptor here. */
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &e) == 0 &&
+ rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(e)) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "We would fetch a v2 rendezvous descriptor, but we "
+ "already have a usable descriptor here. Not fetching.");
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Are we configured to fetch descriptors? */
+ if (!get_options()->FetchHidServDescriptors) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "We received an onion address for a v2 rendezvous "
+ "service descriptor, but are not fetching service descriptors.");
+ return;
+ }
+ log_debug(LD_REND, "Fetching v2 rendezvous descriptor for service %s",
+ safe_str_client(onion_address));
+
+ rend_client_fetch_v2_desc(rend_query, NULL);
+ /* We don't need to look the error code because either on failure or
+ * success, the necessary steps to continue the HS connection will be
+ * triggered once the descriptor arrives or if all fetch failed. */
+ return;
+}
+
+/** Cancel all rendezvous descriptor fetches currently in progress.
+ */
+void
+rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void)
+{
+ smartlist_t *connection_array = get_connection_array();
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(connection_array, connection_t *, conn) {
+ if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR &&
+ conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2) {
+ /* It's a rendezvous descriptor fetch in progress -- cancel it
+ * by marking the connection for close.
+ *
+ * Even if this connection has already reached EOF, this is
+ * enough to make sure that if the descriptor hasn't been
+ * processed yet, it won't be. See the end of
+ * connection_handle_read; connection_reached_eof (indirectly)
+ * processes whatever response the connection received. */
+
+ const rend_data_t *rd = (TO_DIR_CONN(conn))->rend_data;
+ if (!rd) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG | LD_REND,
+ "Marking for close dir conn fetching rendezvous "
+ "descriptor for unknown service!");
+ } else {
+ log_debug(LD_REND, "Marking for close dir conn fetching "
+ "rendezvous descriptor for service %s",
+ safe_str(rend_data_get_address(rd)));
+ }
+ connection_mark_for_close(conn);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
+}
+
+/** Mark <b>failed_intro</b> as a failed introduction point for the
+ * hidden service specified by <b>rend_query</b>. If the HS now has no
+ * usable intro points, or we do not have an HS descriptor for it,
+ * then launch a new renddesc fetch.
+ *
+ * If <b>failure_type</b> is INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC, remove the
+ * intro point from (our parsed copy of) the HS descriptor.
+ *
+ * If <b>failure_type</b> is INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT, mark the
+ * intro point as 'timed out'; it will not be retried until the
+ * current hidden service connection attempt has ended or it has
+ * appeared in a newly fetched rendezvous descriptor.
+ *
+ * If <b>failure_type</b> is INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_UNREACHABLE,
+ * increment the intro point's reachability-failure count; if it has
+ * now failed MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES or more times,
+ * remove the intro point from (our parsed copy of) the HS descriptor.
+ *
+ * Return -1 if error, 0 if no usable intro points remain or service
+ * unrecognized, 1 if recognized and some intro points remain.
+ */
+int
+rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro,
+ rend_data_t *rend_data,
+ unsigned int failure_type)
+{
+ int i, r;
+ rend_cache_entry_t *ent;
+ connection_t *conn;
+ const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data);
+
+ r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &ent);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ /* Either invalid onion address or cache entry not found. */
+ switch (-r) {
+ case EINVAL:
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Malformed service ID %s.",
+ escaped_safe_str_client(onion_address));
+ return -1;
+ case ENOENT:
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown service %s. Re-fetching descriptor.",
+ escaped_safe_str_client(onion_address));
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data);
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown cache lookup returned code: %d", r);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* The intro points are not checked here if they are usable or not because
+ * this is called when an intro point circuit is closed thus there must be
+ * at least one intro point that is usable and is about to be flagged. */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes); i++) {
+ rend_intro_point_t *intro = smartlist_get(ent->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
+ if (tor_memeq(failed_intro->identity_digest,
+ intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ switch (failure_type) {
+ default:
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown failure type %u. Removing intro point.",
+ failure_type);
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ /* fall through */
+ case INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC:
+ rend_cache_intro_failure_note(failure_type,
+ (uint8_t
*)failed_intro->identity_digest,
+ onion_address);
+ rend_intro_point_free(intro);
+ smartlist_del(ent->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
+ break;
+ case INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT:
+ intro->timed_out = 1;
+ break;
+ case INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_UNREACHABLE:
+ ++(intro->unreachable_count);
+ {
+ int zap_intro_point =
+ intro->unreachable_count >= MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES;
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Failed to reach this intro point %u times.%s",
+ intro->unreachable_count,
+ zap_intro_point ? " Removing from descriptor.": "");
+ if (zap_intro_point) {
+ rend_cache_intro_failure_note(
+ failure_type,
+ (uint8_t *) failed_intro->identity_digest, onion_address);
+ rend_intro_point_free(intro);
+ smartlist_del(ent->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(ent)) {
+ log_info(LD_REND,
+ "No more intro points remain for %s. Re-fetching descriptor.",
+ escaped_safe_str_client(onion_address));
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data);
+
+ /* move all pending streams back to renddesc_wait */
+ /* NOTE: We can now do this faster, if we use pending_entry_connections */
+ while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP,
+ AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT,
+ onion_address))) {
+ connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn));
+ conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_REND,"%d options left for %s.",
+ smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes),
+ escaped_safe_str_client(onion_address));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** The service sent us a rendezvous cell; join the circuits. */
+int
+rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
+ size_t request_len)
+{
+ if (request_len != DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Incorrect length (%d) on RENDEZVOUS2 cell.",
+ (int)request_len);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ_legacy_client(circ, request) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Failed to setup circ");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/** Find all the apconns in state AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT that are
+ * waiting on <b>query</b>. If there's a working cache entry here with at
+ * least one intro point, move them to the next state. */
+void
+rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query)
+{
+ entry_connection_t *conn;
+ rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
+ const rend_data_t *rend_data;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, base_conn) {
+ if (base_conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
+ base_conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT ||
+ base_conn->marked_for_close)
+ continue;
+ conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(base_conn);
+ rend_data = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data;
+ if (!rend_data)
+ continue;
+ const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data);
+ if (rend_cmp_service_ids(query, onion_address))
+ continue;
+ assert_connection_ok(base_conn, now);
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1,
+ &entry) == 0 &&
+ rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) {
+ /* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a
+ * valid entry from before which we should reuse */
+ log_info(LD_REND,"Rend desc is usable. Launching circuits.");
+ base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
+
+ /* restart their timeout values, so they get a fair shake at
+ * connecting to the hidden service. */
+ base_conn->timestamp_created = now;
+ base_conn->timestamp_last_read_allowed = now;
+ base_conn->timestamp_last_write_allowed = now;
+
+ connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(conn);
+ } else { /* 404, or fetch didn't get that far */
+ log_notice(LD_REND,"Closing stream for '%s.onion': hidden service is "
+ "unavailable (try again later).",
+ safe_str_client(query));
+ connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
+ rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(rend_data);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(base_conn);
+}
+
+/** Clear temporary state used only during an attempt to connect to the
+ * hidden service with <b>rend_data</b>. Called when a connection attempt
+ * has ended; it is possible for this to be called multiple times while
+ * handling an ended connection attempt, and any future changes to this
+ * function must ensure it remains idempotent. */
+void
+rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(const rend_data_t *rend_data)
+{
+ unsigned int have_onion = 0;
+ rend_cache_entry_t *cache_entry = NULL;
+ const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data);
+ rend_data_v2_t *rend_data_v2 = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data);
+
+ if (onion_address[0] != '\0') {
+ /* Ignore return value; we find an entry, or we don't. */
+ (void) rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &cache_entry);
+ have_onion = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Clear the timed_out flag on all remaining intro points for this HS. */
+ if (cache_entry != NULL) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cache_entry->parsed->intro_nodes,
+ rend_intro_point_t *, ip,
+ ip->timed_out = 0; );
+ }
+
+ /* Remove the HS's entries in last_hid_serv_requests. */
+ if (have_onion) {
+ unsigned int replica;
+ for (replica = 0; replica < ARRAY_LENGTH(rend_data_v2->descriptor_id);
+ replica++) {
+ const char *desc_id = rend_data_v2->descriptor_id[replica];
+ purge_v2_hidserv_req(desc_id);
+ }
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Connection attempt for %s has ended; "
+ "cleaning up temporary state.",
+ safe_str_client(onion_address));
+ } else {
+ /* We only have an ID for a fetch. Probably used by HSFETCH. */
+ purge_v2_hidserv_req(rend_data_v2->desc_id_fetch);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated extend_info_t* for a randomly chosen introduction
+ * point for the named hidden service. Return NULL if all introduction points
+ * have been tried and failed.
+ */
+extend_info_t *
+rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
+{
+ int ret;
+ extend_info_t *result;
+ rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
+ const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_query);
+
+ ret = rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &entry);
+ if (ret < 0 || !rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND,
+ "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
+ safe_str_client(onion_address));
+ /* XXX: Should we refetch the descriptor here if the IPs are not usable
+ * anymore ?. */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */
+ if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 1, 1)))
+ return result;
+ /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node
+ */
+ if (!get_options()->StrictNodes)
+ return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 0, 1);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set
+ * iff <b>strict</b> is true. If <b>warnings</b> is false, don't complain
+ * to the user when we're out of nodes, even if StrictNodes is true.
+ */
+static extend_info_t *
+rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry,
+ const int strict,
+ const int warnings)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ rend_intro_point_t *intro;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ smartlist_t *usable_nodes;
+ int n_excluded = 0;
+
+ /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty,
+ * no nodes are usable. */
+ usable_nodes = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_add_all(usable_nodes, entry->parsed->intro_nodes);
+
+ /* Remove the intro points that have timed out during this HS
+ * connection attempt from our list of usable nodes. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(usable_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *, ip,
+ if (ip->timed_out) {
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(usable_nodes, ip);
+ });
+
+ again:
+ if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) {
+ if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes && warnings) {
+ /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise
+ * we're just about to retry anyways.
+ */
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "All introduction points for hidden service are "
+ "at excluded relays, and StrictNodes is set. Skipping.");
+ }
+ smartlist_free(usable_nodes);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes));
+ intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i);
+ if (BUG(!intro->extend_info)) {
+ /* This should never happen, but it isn't fatal, just try another */
+ smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
+ goto again;
+ }
+ /* All version 2 HS descriptors come with a TAP onion key.
+ * Clients used to try to get the TAP onion key from the consensus, but this
+ * meant that hidden services could discover which consensus clients have.
*/
+ if (!extend_info_supports_tap(intro->extend_info)) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "The HS descriptor is missing a TAP onion key for the "
+ "intro-point relay '%s'; trying another.",
+ safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)));
+ smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
+ goto again;
+ }
+ /* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */
+ if (strict &&
+ routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes,
+ intro->extend_info)) {
+ n_excluded++;
+ smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ smartlist_free(usable_nodes);
+ return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff any introduction points still listed in <b>entry</b> are
+ * usable. */
+int
+rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry)
+{
+ extend_info_t *extend_info =
+ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, get_options()->StrictNodes, 0);
+
+ int rv = (extend_info != NULL);
+
+ extend_info_free(extend_info);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of onion address to
+ * rend_service_authorization_t*. */
+static strmap_t *auth_hid_servs = NULL;
+
+/** Look up the client-side authorization for the hidden service with
+ * <b>onion_address</b>. Return NULL if no authorization is available for
+ * that address. */
+rend_service_authorization_t*
+rend_client_lookup_service_authorization(const char *onion_address)
+{
+ tor_assert(onion_address);
+ if (!auth_hid_servs) return NULL;
+ return strmap_get(auth_hid_servs, onion_address);
+}
+
+#define rend_service_authorization_free(val) \
+ FREE_AND_NULL(rend_service_authorization_t, \
+ rend_service_authorization_free_, (val))
+
+/** Helper: Free storage held by rend_service_authorization_t. */
+static void
+rend_service_authorization_free_(rend_service_authorization_t *auth)
+{
+ tor_free(auth);
+}
+
+/** Helper for strmap_free. */
+static void
+rend_service_authorization_free_void(void *service_auth)
+{
+ rend_service_authorization_free_(service_auth);
+}
+
+/** Release all the storage held in auth_hid_servs.
+ */
+void
+rend_service_authorization_free_all(void)
+{
+ if (!auth_hid_servs) {
+ return;
+ }
+ strmap_free(auth_hid_servs, rend_service_authorization_free_void);
+ auth_hid_servs = NULL;
+}
+
+/** Parse <b>config_line</b> as a client-side authorization for a hidden
+ * service and add it to the local map of hidden service authorizations.
+ * Return 0 for success and -1 for failure. */
+int
+rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
+ int validate_only)
+{
+ config_line_t *line;
+ int res = -1;
+ strmap_t *parsed = strmap_new();
+ smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
+ rend_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL;
+ char *err_msg = NULL;
+
+ for (line = options->HidServAuth; line; line = line->next) {
+ char *onion_address, *descriptor_cookie;
+ auth = NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c););
+ smartlist_clear(sl);
+ smartlist_split_string(sl, line->value, " ",
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 3);
+ if (smartlist_len(sl) < 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Configuration line does not consist of "
+ "\"onion-address authorization-cookie [service-name]\": "
+ "'%s'", line->value);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ auth = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_authorization_t));
+ /* Parse onion address. */
+ onion_address = smartlist_get(sl, 0);
+ if (strlen(onion_address) != REND_SERVICE_ADDRESS_LEN ||
+ strcmpend(onion_address, ".onion")) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion address has wrong format: '%s'",
+ onion_address);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ strlcpy(auth->onion_address, onion_address, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1);
+ if (!rend_valid_v2_service_id(auth->onion_address)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion address has wrong format: '%s'",
+ onion_address);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Parse descriptor cookie. */
+ descriptor_cookie = smartlist_get(sl, 1);
+ if (rend_auth_decode_cookie(descriptor_cookie, auth->descriptor_cookie,
+ &auth->auth_type, &err_msg) < 0) {
+ tor_assert(err_msg);
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%s", err_msg);
+ tor_free(err_msg);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (strmap_get(parsed, auth->onion_address)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Duplicate authorization for the same hidden "
+ "service.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ strmap_set(parsed, auth->onion_address, auth);
+ auth = NULL;
+ }
+ res = 0;
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ res = -1;
+ done:
+ rend_service_authorization_free(auth);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c););
+ smartlist_free(sl);
+ if (!validate_only && res == 0) {
+ rend_service_authorization_free_all();
+ auth_hid_servs = parsed;
+ } else {
+ strmap_free(parsed, rend_service_authorization_free_void);
+ }
+ return res;
+}
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